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SPECIAL PROJECT
The One Hundred and First Justice: An Analysis
of the Opinions of Justice John Paul Stevens,
Sitting as Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In mid-December 1975 the United States Senate confirmed by
a unanimous vote the nomination of John Paul Stevens as the one
hundred and first justice to sit on the United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Stevens was graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Chicago and attended Northwestern University Law
School, where he finished first in his class. After clerking for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, Stevens entered private practice, specializing in antitrust law. In 1970 former President Nixon
appointed Stevens to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, a position he held until his confirmation as an
associate justice. The appointment of Mr. Justice Stevens occurs
when a number of critical issues-including the death penalty, racial segregation in private schools, court-imposed "gag" orders on
the press, and abortion-are before the Court. His appointment has
generated much speculation about the direction in which the Court
will now move. Known for placing great emphasis on the particular
facts of the cases he decides, Stevens has earned a reputation as a
moderate.
This acticle will examine the opinions written by Mr. Justice
Stevens while he served on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The areas examined are constitutional, antitrust, labor,
securities, federal tax, administrative, and federal jurisdictional
law.* This article also will seek to reach some conclusions on Stevens' position in the several areas while he served on the Seventh
Circuit and to suggest the factors he may consider important in
deciding cases in the future. We hope the article will give its readers
an opportunity to analyze and evaluate the existing opinions of the
new associate justice and to gain some insight into the way he approaches cases. An appendix is provided that describes briefly those
opinions we consider of interest.'
*In analyzing the decisions of Mr. Justice Stevens during his tenure on the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals, the authors obtained a list of opinions from LEXIS, a computerassisted legal research system. LEXIS is a full-text legal research service. The full texts of
legal documents are stored word for word, precisely as reported, in the computer's data bank.
LEXIS is a service of Mead Data Central, Inc., 200 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017.
1. The information used in the INTRODUCTION was taken from the following sources: 36
CCH SUPREME COURT BULLETIN No. 9 (December 1, 1975); N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1975, § 1, at
1, col. 7; Lewis, The Stevens Nomination, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1975, at 41, col. 5; Time
(magazine), Dec. 8, 1975, at 58, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 7.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Justice Stevens has written opinions dealing with due process,
equal protection, the amount and character of state action required
under the fourteenth amendment, the seventh amendment right to
a jury trial, the first amendment right of expression, and the right
of privacy. His opinions in each of these areas will be discussed in
the order presented above. For the sake of clarity and order, the due
process opinions have been subdivided into those dealing with procedural rights and those dealing with substantive rights. A discussion of several interesting opinions in the area of juvenile rights ends
the section. Part II does not include discussion of opinions in criminal constitutional law. Part Ill covers that area.
A.
(1)

Due Process

Procedural Due Process

The majority of procedural due process cases that Justice Stevens considered on the Seventh Circuit focused on the pretermination procedural rights of public employees. In Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth,' the Supreme Court decided that a former
government employee who claims the procedure of his dismissal
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment must
first establish that the state has invaded an interest protected by
the amendment. To show invasion of a property interest, the plaintiff must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the position.' In
the absence of a contractual right or statutory tenure no claim of
entitlement exists unless the policies and practices of the employer
or explicit bilateral understandings support the employee's claim.
A subjective expectation that the employment will continue is insufficient.' To show invasion of an interest in liberty within the
meaning of the amendment, the plaintiff may show that his
termination violated specific Bill of Rights guarantees or the fundamental liberties emanating from them; 5 imposed a stigma on his
honor, reputation, or integrity;' deprived him of the opportunity of
2. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3. Id. at 577.
4. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
5. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968) (certain provisions of the Bill of
Rights are incorporated by the fourteenth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment includes those privileges
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness).
6. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
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future government employment;7 or completely foreclosed him from
further employment in his profession.' Unless a public employee
demonstrates a deprivation of property or liberty, he has no fourteenth amendment claim to a pretermination notice or hearing.
In his first public employment termination case, Shirck v.
Thomas,' Justice Stevens narrowly defined the interests in liberty
and property protected by the fourteenth amendment and displayed
a reluctance to expand an individual's procedural due process
rights. Plaintiff, a public school teacher, claimed that the nonrenewal of her contract constituted an invasion of her liberty and
property, entitling her to the procedural guarantees of the due process clause. In compliance with a state statute, the school board
provided plaintiff with notice of her dismissal and a statement of
reasons for it but denied her a hearing. The Seventh Circuit, Justice
Stevens dissenting, held that the failure to provide a hearing constituted a violation of plaintiff's procedural due process rights.'" In
light of its recent opinion in Roth the Supreme Court vacated the
Seventh Circuit's decision." On remand, Stevens wrote the court's
opinion.' 2 He said that the state requirement of notice prior to dismissal did not endow plaintiff with a sufficient claim of entitlement
to her employment. Since plaintiff had neither statutory tenure nor
an express or implied contractual agreement, Stevens reasoned that
she possessed no property interest in her position. He stated further
that the school board's action deprived plaintiff of no interest in
liberty because the nonrenewal did not violate an independent constitutional right, did not stigmatize her name or reputation, and did
not impair her ability to gain other employment.' 3 Since no constitutionally protected interest was impaired, Stevens found that the
due process clause did not require that plaintiff receive a hearing
before the school board.
Stevens' opinion in Adams v. Walker'4 also took a narrow view
of the scope of protected liberty and property and demonstrated a
deference to the actions of state officials. In Adams the governor of
Illinois removed the state liquor commission chairman without a
hearing. The former chairman brought suit claiming that this vio7. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951).
8. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957).
9. 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g on rehearing,447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971).
10. 447 F.2d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 1971).
11. 408 U.S. 940 (1972).
12. 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973).
13. Id. at 692-93.
14. 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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lated his right to procedural due process. The court held that plaintiff had no protected interest in his position which would entitle him
to a due process hearing upon discharge. In a concurring opinion
Stevens noted that under Illinois law plaintiff's six-year term could
be ended at the discretion of the governor. Stevens, therefore, held
that plaintiff was not deprived of any property interest. Though the
stated reasons for plaintiff's dismissal were incompetence, neglect
of duty, and malfeasance in office, Stevens found that they did not
constitute a stigma which impaired plaintiff's interest in liberty. He
based this determination on the political context in which the accusations were made and the first amendment protection of defamatory statements concerning public officials. 5 Stevens' analysis
stressed that the dismissal was a policy decision by the governor. He
thus concluded that any due process hearing would either be meaningless or "involve an excessive invasion by the federal judiciary
into the making of policy by the State."'"
Justice Stevens elaborated on his view of procedural due process in two additional opinions. Plaintiff in McTaggart v. Secretary
of the Air Force'7 was afforded notice and a hearing prior to his
involuntary discharge. At the hearing, however, plaintiff bore the
burden of showing cause why he should not be discharged. Justice
Stevens held that this did not violate plaintiff's procedural rights.
Kimbrough v. O'Neil' involved a prisoner who alleged that a ring
taken from him by prison officials was not returned upon his release.
Stevens concurred with the court's decision to reverse the district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, but postulated that deprivations of property may require lesser procedural safeguards than
deprivations of liberty. Stevens stated that under the instant facts
the remedy of a post-deprivation action against the prison officials
in the state courts satisfied the requirements of due process.
Justice Stevens' holding in each of these cases evinces a narrow
construction of the due process clause and a restrictive interpretation of the apposite Supreme Court opinions. Implicit in Shirck and
Adams are a limited view of the liberty protected by the fourteenth
amendment and a concomitantly expansive view of the discretion15. Stevens recognized that if a finding of malfeasance disqualified a law school graduate from admission to the bar, or caused a prison inmate to forfeit his good time credits, an
interest in liberty would be impaired. But he concluded that when such an accusation is made
in the context in which important political figures routinely use uncomplimentary language
about one another, procedural due process does not apply. Id. at 1010.
16. Id.
17. 458 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1972).
18. 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975).

19761

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

ary authority and policy-making responsibilities of state officials. In
Roth the Supreme Court expressly recognized that an interest in
liberty is invaded when a public employee's "good name, reputation, honor or integrity" is at stake or when a state-imposed stigma
forecloses his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. " A liberal interpretation of Roth might well result in
the application of this language to the summary dismissal of a nontenured teacher and to the removal of a state official for alleged
malfeasance in office. Yet in both Shirck and Adams, Stevens denied that the employee's interest in liberty had been impaired sufficiently to require a due process hearing. Coupled with his narrow
definition of liberty is a desire to avoid interference with the determination and the implementation of policy decisions by state and
local officials. In his dissent in Shirck I Stevens declared that
teacher-school board relations are peculiarly the concern of state
policy rather than federal constitutional law. " Stevens recognized
that a due process hearing presupposes the formulation of standards
to be applied in testing the state's action. When the discretionary
action of a state official in a policy-making position is involved,
Stevens seems to conclude that a hearing testing the fairness of the
official's action might involve an invasion by the federal judiciary
of a sphere reserved for the states. Justice Stevens' limited definition of a public employee's protected interest in liberty, reinforced
by the wide latitude that he gives to the policy decisions of state
officials, thus results in a narrow scope for procedural due process
protection. It seems likely that the policies leading him to define
due process narrowly in the context of public employment would
lead him to define it narrowly in other areas as well.
(2)

Substantive Due Process

In its broadest sense the due process clause requires not only
that state deprivation of life, liberty, or property be procedurally
fair, but also that it have a rational basis. This concept of substantive due process demands that state action not be unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected have a real and
substantial relation to a permissible state purpose. 21 Justice Stevens' disposition of two teacher dismissal cases and his dissent in a
third disclose a narrow construction of the substantive rights created by the due process clause.
19.
20.
21.

408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
447 F.2d at 1028.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
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Stevens' decision in Jeffries v. Turkey Run ConsolidatedSchool
District 2 expanded his "protected interest" analysis to encompass
claims of substantive rights under the due process clause. In
Jeffries, plaintiff, a nontenured teacher, claimed that her right to
substantive due process protected her against "arbitrary and capricious" discharge by the school board. Justice Stevens stated that
the invasion of an interest in liberty or property is an absolute
precondition to establishing a deprivation of substantive due process. This was the identical test applied by the Supreme Court in
Roth to alleged deprivations of procedural due process. Stevens determined that plaintiff's lack of tenure or any claim of entitlement
to her position established the absence of any property interest.
Applying his Shirck H definition of an interest in liberty, Stevens
asserted that the school board's action did not infringe plaintiff's
constitutionally protected liberty. He concluded that these findings
were fatal to plaintiff's claim since the constitutional right to substantive due process is no greater than the right to procedural due
process.23 Jeffries thus imposed the Roth "protected interest" requirement on claims alleging violations of substantive rights protected by the due process clause.
In Miller v. School DistrictNo. 16724 Stevens applied a "magnitude of the deprivation" test, coupled with a deference to the policy
decisions of local officials, in holding that dismissal from public
employment based on the employee's personal appearance is not
forbidden by the demands of substantive due process. Plaintiffteacher alleged that the school board's decision to terminate his
employment was based on his mode of dress and appearance. Stevens agreed with plaintiff's claim that his right to choose his
personal appearance was an aspect of his interest in liberty. Noting
the variety of reasons that justify governmental limitation of an
individual's choice of appearance, however, Stevens rejected the
contention that every state restriction of that interest is an unconstitutional deprivation. Asserting that the impairment of plaintiff's
liberty was relatively minor at best, he balanced the magnitude of
the deprivation against the public interest in an effective educational process and concluded that the individual deprivation was
outweighed by the public interest. Stevens denied that the mere
allegation that plaintiff's personal appearance was a factor in his
dismissal was sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. Stevens
22.
23.
24.

492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 4.
495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974).
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stated that a review of the school board's action necessarily would
require the court to determine the standards by which to test the
board's decision. He concluded that the only applicable standard
was an evaluation of the decision's rationality. Stevens believed
that, in light of the local school board's special competence and
experience, such a standard of review was too indefinite to justify
substitution of the court's judgment for that of the board, at least
when plaintiff alleged no denial of an independent constitutional
right.7 Stevens thus held that a teacher's interest in selecting his
own mode of dress and appearance is subordinate to the overriding
public interest in the educational process and the latitude needed
by the school board to discharge its responsibilities effectively.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Shirck 12 confirms his unwillingness
to interpret substantive due process requirements in a manner that
would involve the federal courts in policy-making at the state level.
Rejecting the court's interpretation of the due process clause as
entitling plaintiff-teacher to a pretermination hearing, Stevens
emphasized that in the final analysis the due process decision in
such a case would turn on the court's evaluation of the substance
of the school board's administrative determination. While Stevens
believed that federal judges are qualified "to evaluate procedural
fairness and to interpret and apply guidelines established by others," he stated that they lacked the special competence necessary
27
to make the kind of policy judgment implicit in this case.
Justice Stevens' use of a "protected interest" analysis subjects
substantive due process claims to the same scrutiny as procedural
claims. A plaintiff alleging violation of either must first show an
interest in property or liberty. This requirement screens out a substantial number of claims. The substantive rights that Stevens finds
in the due process clause are further limited by his balancing of the
magnitude of the individual deprivation against the opposing public
interest and by his deference to the judgment of state officials. He
fundamentally disagrees with the reasoning that "the same element-'freedom from arbitrariness'-should at once entitle a per'2
son to due process and also be a part of the process which is due.

An opposition to the unnecessary transfer of power from the states
to the federal government is characteristic of each of these opinions.
Stevens opposes any interpretation of substantive due process that
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 664-68.
447 F.2d at 1028.
Id. at 1029.
Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4, n.8 (7th Cir. 1974).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:125

would significantly enlarge the responsibility and power of the federal judiciary and lead it into unprecedented participation in local
affairs. 29 The Supreme Court recently has tended to uphold state
action in many areas in which the Warren Court vigorously applied
federal policies." Justice Stevens' philosophy seems to conform to
this trend.
B.

Equal Protection

In the area of equal protection, Justice Stevens' decisions reflect his belief that the state should afford evenhanded treatment
to all minority groups. Stevens argues that invidious discrimination
against groups because of their political affiliation or lineage is just
as indefensible as racial discrimination. A second characteristic of
his equal protection cases is a careful scrutiny of all the facts in
determining whether a particular classification has a rational basis.
These two aspects of his approach to equal protection analysis are
exemplified in Cousins v. City Council of Chicago,3' which deals
32
with racial and political gerrymandering, and Eskra v. Morton,
which deals with the rights of illegitimate children.
Until Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 3 the apportionment of voting districts had been considered a political question beyond the purview
of the Constitution. In Gomillion, however, the Supreme Court held
that gerrymandering of voting districts according to race violated
the fifteenth amendment. In Reynolds v. Sims,34 the Court established the one-man-one-vote rule, holding that the equal protection
clause prohibits gross legislative misapportionment. Yet the Supreme Court has held that the shuffling of voting blocs on a partisan
rather than racial or ethnic basis presents a nonjusticiable political
35
question.
In Cousins v. City Council of Chicago36 the Seventh Circuit
declared that the equal protection clause prohibits ethnic as well as
racial gerrymandering but held that manipulation of voting districts
29. Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658, 666 (7th Cir. 1974).
30. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (respect for local community
obscenity standards); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1973)
(deference to the value of local control over public education); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S.
315, 328-29 (1973) (flexible standards for the apportionment of state legislatures).
31. 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
32. 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975).
33. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
34. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35. WMCA, Inc. v. Lorenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 4
(1965).
36. 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
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to dilute the voting strength of independents presented a nonjusticiable political question. The plaintiffs alleged that the 1970
ward boundaries established in Chicago were designed specifically
to dilute the voting strength of the city's black voters, Puerto Rican
voters, and voters of "independent" political registration. In dissent, Justice Stevens declared that the majority erred in judging
racial and political gerrymandering by different constitutional standards. He asserted that the impact of gerrymandering on an individual's right to vote and minority group's political strength may be
invidious whether the discrimination is racial or political in nature"
and that gerrymandering according to voters' political persuasion
presented a justiciable issue, not a nonjusticiable political question.
As a secondary issue, Stevens concluded that in a gerrymandering
case, the plaintiff must show that the legislative classification is
wholly irrational. He stated that the trial judge must examine in
each case the historic political boundaries, natural barriers, the
compactness and contiguity of the voting districts, and whether the
districts are divided equally according to population in determining
whether the legislature's purpose is rational.
The Supreme Court has held that wrongful death statutes denying recovery to a bastard or his parent violate the equal protection clause." In the 1971 case of Labine v. Vincent," however, the
Court upheld a statute of intestate succession that denied an illegitimate child any portion of his father's estate. The Court argued
that the state had a compelling interest in protecting the family unit
and regulating the prompt disposition of intestate property.'
In Eskra v. Morton,4" Justice Stevens held that the federal government may not discriminate against a bastard when it distributes
the property of her intestate maternal collateral relative. In Eskra,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs distributed the estate of plaintiff's
maternal great aunt according to Wisconsin law, which prevented
plaintiff, a bastard, from taking through her mother. The district
court found Labine controlling and upheld the distribution. The
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Stevens, reversed, indicating that
the government's interest in prompt and certain determination of
37. Id. at 850.
38. Id. at 859.
39.

See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louis-

iana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
40.
41.
42.

401 U.S. 532 (1971).
Id. at 536.
524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975).
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property ownership varies according to whether the illegitimate
child seeks to share through her father or her mother. Because establishing the identity of the illegitimate child's father generally is
more difficult than identifying her mother,4 3 Stevens held that classification of children according to their illegitimate status is a form
of invidious discrimination.
In contrast to Stevens' inclination to define due process narrowly and to defer to the trial court's fact determination in state
action cases, Justice Stevens' equal protection decisions evidence a
marked willingness to declare wholly irrational, classifications sustained in the lower court. In his dissent in Cousins, Justice Stevens
refused to defer to the majority rule that political gerrymandering
is a nonjusticiable political question beyond the scope of a federal
judge. Instead, Stevens boldly asserted that any court ruling which
would result in holding racial gerrymandering but not political gerrymandering a violation of the equal protection clause itself constitutes invidious discrimination. Thus, Cousins suggests Stevens' belief that an equal protection question should turn not on the particular group discriminated against but on the rational basis of the
legislative classification. By demanding that the equal protection
clause afford evenhanded treatment to all minority groups, Stevens
indicates his position in future decisions is likely to emphasize a
rigorous questioning of legislative purpose rather than an overt concern with the suspect nature of the class discriminated against. As
reflected in Cousins and Eskra, Justice Stevens believes that the
equal protection clause prohibits all forms of irrational legislative
classification and not just discrimination against certain historically deprived groups.
C.

State Action

Justice Stevens' decisions in the area of state action indicate he
feels that the fourteenth amendment should be limited to discriminatory actions by the state. Stevens believes that the "color of state
law" requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 198311 means that private conduct
is proscribed only when the state affirmatively supports it. Although
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) has no express "color of state law" require43.

Id. at 14.

44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section of the Civil Rights Act authorizes a civil action
for the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution. It is restricted to those deprivations
caused by persons acting under the color of any "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory. ...

"
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ment, 5 Stevens has required a showing of state action to establish
that a fourteenth amendment right has been violated. In these decisions Stevens scrutinized every allegation of state involvement in
order to determine whether the state has fostered or encouraged the
discriminatory activity. He has written three significant decisions
in this area dealing with the actions of an electrical power company,
a private university, and a real estate management company.
The Supreme Court consistently has held that section 1983 and
the fifth and fourteenth amendments proscribe only state action
and do not prohibit the activities of a private, nongovernmental
organization.46 In Moose Lodge v. Irvis" the Supreme Court held
that the presence of state regulation of a private organization is
insufficient to establish a section 1983 cause of action unless the
regulation affirmatively sponsors the discriminatory activity. In
Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.," Justice Stevens, writing
the majority opinion, held that in spite of pervasive governmental
regulation and the state's grant of a monopoly, a power company
was not acting under "color of state law" when it discontinued
plaintiff's electrical service. The plaintiff alleged that lack of a prior
hearing on the disputed account violated procedural due process.
Justice Stevens concluded that the regulation of public utilities and
their status as tolerated monopolies do not provide the kind of state
support of private conduct that will transform an issue of state
regulatory policy into a section 1983 cause of action.49
In the majority opinion in Cohen v. Illinois Institute of
Technology,50 Justice Stevens held that a private university which
refused to grant tenure to a faculty member because of her sex had
not acted under "color of state law" within the meaning of section
1983. The plaintiff argued that the university held itself out as a
public institution, received various types of state financial assistance, and submitted to extensive state regulations. But Stevens
again reasoned that state involvement, by itself, will not sustain a
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) in relevant part provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of
depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws. ....
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages.
46. E.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
47. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
48. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
49. 466 F.2d at 658.
50. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
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section 1983 action unless the state's support has fostered the activities challenged."
Stevens' opinions in section 1985(3) suits also display this comparatively demanding test for state action. The seminal Supreme
Court case under this section is Griffin v. Breckenridge,2 in which
the Court for the first time invoked federal jurisdiction under section 1985(3) in cases of private conspiracies aimed at depriving an
individual of equal protection of the laws. In Griffin, several Negroes
traveling interstate were assaulted by a group of local vigilantes.
The Court held that a private conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs
of their thirteenth amendment rights or their right to interstate
travel was actionable under section 1985(3). The Court, however,
refrained from holding that all discrimination would be actionable
under section 1985(3) by suggesting that a state action requirement
must be met in a suit alleging fourteenth amendment violations.
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Dombrowski v. Dowling"
held that arbitrary discrimination of a real estate management company against attorneys engaged in criminal practice did not deprive
plaintiff of equal protection under section 1985(3) because there was
no state action in the challenged activity. 5 Plaintiff maintained
that he was refused office space in defendant's building because his
clientele were largely Negro or Latin-American. Although Stevens
agreed with Griffin that private conspiracies are actionable under
section 1985(3), he asserted that only three categories of rights have
been identified as protected under section 1985(3): black citizens'
thirteenth amendment rights; an individual's right to interstate
travel; and rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. In fourteenth amendment cases, however, Stevens maintained that section
1985(3) requires a showing of state action. Addressing the section
1985(3) count of the plaintiffs complaint in Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology,55 Justice Stevens held that the court's reasoning
in Dombrowski applied to plaintiff's charge of a private conspiracy
to deprive women of faculty appointments. Thus Cohen affirms
Stevens' holding in Dombrowski that section 1985(3) requires proof
of state action in a suit alleging a fourteenth amendment violation.
Stevens' "state action" decisions reveal his strong belief that
the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit only state initiated
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 824-26.
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
459 F.2d 190 (1972).
Id. at 196.
524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975).
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or state supported discrimination. Stevens fears that any less strict
approach will blur a crucial distinction between state and private
conduct, allowing all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the
rights of others to become federal issues. Stevens is convinced that
this is not the purpose of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In
accord with the Supreme Court's holding in Moose Lodge, Stevens
believes that the plaintiff must show that somehow the state's action encouraged or supported the discriminatory activity. Finally,
all three state action cases demonstrate Justice Stevens' case-bycase evaluation of the facts in ascertaining whether the plaintiff has
proved a sufficient level of state action.
D. Right to Jury Trial
In 1959, the Supreme Court's decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover6 established a strong federal policy favoring the seventh amendment right to trial by jury. 7 In Beacon the Court held
that when legal and equitable claims both are present, the order of
trial must be arranged to try the legal issues to a jury before the
court rules on the purely equitable issues. 5 Three years later in
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood 51 the Court extended the right to a jury
trial to all legal issues, even those incidental to a primarily equitable
0 was the
claim. The redefining of a legal claim in Ross v. Bernhard"
culmination of this line of cases. Refusing to limit the determination
of whether a claim is legal or equitable to the traditional historical
test,6' the Court required a jury trial if (1) the type of remedy sought
was traditionally awarded by a jury and (2) the nature of the dispute
presented no obstacle to the practical abilities and limitations of
juries.62 When these two considerations indicate that a claim is legal
in nature, a constitutional right to trial by jury arises even though
such a claim was historically the exclusive province of equity.
The application of this line of cases to litigation arising under
56. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
57. The seventh amendment provides that "in suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
58. 359 U.S. at 508.
59. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
60. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
61. Under the traditional historical test the courts interpreted the seventh amendment
to preserve the substance of the right to jury trial that existed under English common law in
1791 when the amendment was adopted. Actions at law and in equity, for jury purposes, were
frozen categorically as of 1791. Unless a particular type of action existed at that time and
was deemed a suit at common law, no right to a jury trial could exist.

62.

396 U.S. at 538.
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the civil rights legislation of the 1960's has produced conflicting
results. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 has been construed
to provide an essentially equitable remedy." When litigation appeared under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act)," however, the federal district courts split regarding the
legal or equitable nature of the claims.6 In Rogers v. Loether" Justice Stevens subjected the arguments favoring denial of jury trial in
housing discrimination suits to rigorous judicial scrutiny and
rejected them. In that case plaintiff, a black woman, sued
defendant-landlord under Title VIII for racial discrimination in the
renting of an apartment. She requested compensatory and punitive
damages and an injunction to restrain the landlord from renting to
anyone else. Stevens held that the action was in the nature of a suit
at common law and that defendant was entitled to a jury trial.
Noting that the proceeding was judicial in character rather than
administrative or statutory and that the remedy of compensatory
and punitive damages is the relief most typical of a legal claim, he
found that the remedy sought was appropriate for jury determination and that the dispute presented no obstacle to the practical
abilities and limitations of juries. Stevens, therefore, concluded that
the claim satisfied the test enunciated in Ross v. Bernhard and was
essentially legal in nature. 9 Under the Beacon and Dairy Queen
cases, he found that the legal claim had to be tried to a jury even
though the request for injunctive relief presented an equitable issue.
Finally, Justice Stevens distinguished Title VII actions. He reasoned that an award of back pay is equitable because it places the
plaintiff in the situation that would have existed had the statute not
63.
64.
65.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (prohibiting employment discrimination).
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).

66. Three district courts have held that the discretionary language of the prescribed
relief, the limitation upon punitive damages, and the similarity to Title VII suits demonstrate
that a Title VIII claim is equitable in nature. Marr v. Rife, 363 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ohio
1973); Cauley v. Smith, 347 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1972); Rogers v. Loether, 312 F. Supp.
1008 (E.D. Wisc. 1972). On the other hand two district courts have ruled that Title VIII
actions in which the plaintiff requests actual or punitive damages are traditionally legal in
character, and thus the defendant's demand for jury trial must be granted. Kelly v. Armbrust, 351 F. Supp. 869 (D.N.D. 1972); Kastner v. Brackett, 326 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Nev. 1971).
67. 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
68. The arguments advanced for denying the right to trial by jury in Title VIII actions
include (1) that the nature of the claim is essentially equitable, (2) that the action is analogous to Title VII suits, in which the right to jury trial has been denied, (3) that such a right
is not expressed in the statutory scheme from which the cause of action derives, (4) that
analogous legislation indicates that no right to jury trial was intended by Congress, and
(5) that the public and social policies against jury trials are overriding.

69. 467 F.2d at 1118.
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been violated, while compensatory damages in a Title VIII action
constitute payment for the losses suffered by plaintiff as a result of
defendant's breach of duty and cannot properly be termed restitutionary.'0
Justice Stevens' analysis in Rogers v. Loether reflects an expansive interpretation of the seventh amendment and a refusal to allow
considerations of social policy to infringe on the right to trial by
jury. His construction of the statutory language in a manner favorable to jury trial and his belief in the adaptability of the common law
to the adjudication of new legal rights are supported by Beacon,
Dairy Queen, and Ross. Stevens recognized that the social policy
considerations behind civil rights legislation probably favor denial
of the right to trial by jury. His conclusion that these are insufficient
to overcome the clear command of the seventh amendment indicates a fundamental faith in the jury trial.
E.

First Amendment Rights

While on the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens wrote five opinions concerning first amendment freedom of speech and expression.
The fact situations of these cases are highly diverse. Common to
each, however, is an attempt both to protect "the exchange of information and ideas in the intellectual marketplace" and to give effect
to the competing interests of society.
In Morales v. Schmidt,7' Stevens considered the conflict between prisoners' first amendment rights and society's interest in
their rehabilitation and control. The federal courts have adopted
inconsistent approaches to whether and to what extent prison regulations may restrict first amendment rights such as freedom of
speech. These range from a hands-off posture 2 to the requirement
that the regulations be justified by a compelling state interest.13 In
Morales prison officials had prohibited an inmate from corresponding with his sister-in-law because he was the father of her illegitimate child. The officials alleged that the ban was necessary to the
inmate's rehabilitation. The prisoner sought to enjoin this interference with his freedom of communication. The district court's deci70. Id. at 1121-22. Justice Stevens' decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in an
opinion relying heavily on Stevens' characterization of the remedy sought as traditionally
legal relief, his analogy to tort actions recognized at common law, and his distinction between
Title VII and Title VIII cases. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
71. 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd en banc, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
72. McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964).
73. Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
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sion for plaintiff was reversed by the Seventh Circuit. 74 Justice Stevens dissented, asserting that state action which places a prior restraint on a prisoner's freedom of expression requires close judicial
scrutiny. Stevens declared that a person's incarceration does not
completely extinguish his first amendment rights, but added that
the fact of conviction is a sufficient basis for some limitation.
Closely examining the facts, Stevens found that the decision to
prohibit plaintiff's communication with his sister-in-law was an ad
hoc determination and not the implementation of a preformulated
standard. He stated that therefore the strong presumption of regularity normally supporting a state official's exercise of discretionary
authority did not apply. Stevens declared that the risks of error
inherent in ad hoc infringements of first amendment rights require
the courts to employ a strict standard of judicial review. 5
On rehearing en banc the Seventh Circuit reversed its original
decision. 7 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the
court that state restriction of a prisoner's first amendment rights is
impermissible unless "related both reasonably and necessarily to
the advancement of a justifiable purpose of imprisonment."7 7 Stevens added, however, that satisfaction of this test would not necessarily justify every prior restraint. He urged that the application of
the standard be limited to prison rules regulating mail and similar
matters and stressed the state's heavy burden of justification when
it acts on an ad hoc basis. He added that a vague or general regulation allowing prison officials wide discretion is tantamount to no
rule at all. Thus Stevens would also subject broad rules to a strict
78
standard of review.
In Herzbrun v. Milwaukee County" Justice Stevens stated that
the freedom of speech does not extend to harmful conduct if the
conduct is not even arguably communicative. Plaintiffs in Herzbrun
were welfare department employees who, in a dispute with management, physically interfered with the conduct of the department's
74. The court held that prison mail censorship is permissible when the state's action
bears a rational relationship to or is reasonably necessary for advancement of a justifiable
state purpose. 489 F.2d at 1343.
75. Id. at 1347-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
77. Id. at 87.
78. Subsequent to Morales, the Supreme Court in Procunierv. Martinez required that
prison mail regulations "further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of expression" and be "no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of. . .[that] interest." 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
79. 504 F.2d 1189 (1974).
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business by disrupting telephone communications. Upon their discharge under a civil service rule the employees brought suit, claiming that the rule was overbroad and violated the guarantees of the
first amendment. The court held that the rule was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Justice Stevens concurred in the court's decision
but questioned plaintiffs' standing to invoke the first amendment
since their conduct was not even arguably communicative."0 He
argued that the claim of overbreadth cannot be raised when the
statute does not discourage the free interchange of information and
ideas. Although he was willing to permit unprotected speech to go
unpunished to avoid inhibiting protected speech, Stevens refused to
invalidate completely a rule prohibiting harmful nonexpressive conduct on the ground that it purported to regulate speech or expressive
conduct. He urged that a finding of overbreadth should bar enforcement of the rule only when it is applied against speech and expressive conduct. 1
Stevens considered the constitutional right of a male high
82 and conschool student to wear long hair in Arnold v. Carpenter
cluded that this freedom is tempered by society's interest in observing certain traditions and in subjecting children to parental control.
The Seventh Circuit previously had characterized the length of
one's hair as either a form of symbolic speech protected by the first
amendment or a ninth amendment right retained by the people."
In Arnold a majority of the student body had approved a dress code
that permitted exemption if the student's parents gave written approval. The court declared that the failure of his parents to sign a
consent form could not justify the denial of the student's constitutional right to determine his own hair length and held the Arnold
dress code unconstitutional. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
urged that the consent provision sufficiently protected the student's
interest in individual expression." Stevens argued that a child has
no constitutional right to wear long hair in opposition to the wishes
of parents and teachers. If they agree to compel observance of a
given form of tradition, regardless of rationality, then the child must
obey, Stevens said. 5 Since a student's parents could excuse him
from compliance with the dress code, Justice Stevens found no
80.
81.
82.
case see
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198.
459 U.S. 939 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For further discussion of this
notes 97-102 infra and accompanying text.
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
459 F.2d at 944-46.
Id. at 944.
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threat to freedom of speech and expression or to any other fundamental constitutional value. 6
Justice Stevens' first amendment opinions evince a willingness
to balance the constitutional right of free speech with competing
interests of society. In Morales he recognized the value of rehabilitation and effective prison administration and rejected the "compelling state interest" standard for reviewing prison mail regulations.
In Herzbrun he emphasized society's interest in prohibiting conduct
disruptive of state offices. In Arnold he stressed the values of parental control of children and observance of tradition. Stevens assigns
varying degrees of importance to different forms of expression; as
the conduct becomes less communicative or expressive, he accords
greater weight to competing values. Justice Stevens' approach
stresses that freedom of speech is a fundamental right but recognizes that its exercise must be compatible with the preservation of
other essential values.
F.

Right of Privacy

The constitutional right of privacy first recognized in Griswold
v. Connecticut87 has been extended during the past decade to encompass sexual intimacy, procreation, parenthood, child rearing,
the family, and the home. 8 In Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial
Hospital,89 Justice Stevens considered whether a public hospital's
exclusion of an expectant father from the delivery room during birth
violated his and his wife's right of marital privacy. The couple was
86. The fifth case in which Justice Stevens considered a first amendment issue is Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Plaintiff, a
lawyer representing a murder victim's family in a civil action for damages, claimed that a
magazine article reporting on the murder trial contained defamatory statements. Stevens
followed the rule of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), that a defamatory
statement about a private individual, but involving an event of public concern, is protected
by the first amendment unless the publication was made with knowledge that the statement
was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth. Finding no knowledge or reckless disregard
of falsity by the publisher, he held for the defendant. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court
reversed itself and held that Rosenbloom was no longer binding on the states.
87. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88. See Re v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (woman has
right to abortion in certain circumstances); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unmarried
father has custodial rights to his child); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried
persons have right to use contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (black and
white persons have right to marry); Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir.
1973) (pregnant teacher has right to continue working); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th
Cir. 1968) (married couple has right to engage in deviant sexual activity); Davis v. Meek, 344
F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (married high school student has right to participate in
extracurricular activities). See also, Comment, The Constitutional Right of Privacy: An
Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 263, 264-77 (1974).
89. 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
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trained in the LaMaze method of childbirth"0 and their personal
physician consented to the husband's presence in the delivery room.
Stevens held that the right of marital privacy does not include the
right of either spouse to have the husband present at childbirth
when the hospital has adopted a rule requiring his exclusion.,' His
opinion expresses a reluctance even to characterize such cases as
right of privacy cases. He would limit the privacy concept to cases
involving the individual's interest in protection from unwarranted
public attention, comment, or exploitation and would exclude cases
concerning fundamental personal, familial, and procreative rights.
He prefers to view previous authority as upholding the individual's
right to make certain unusually important decisions involving basic
values and affecting his or his family's destiny. 2 Stevens felt that
in Fitzgerald plaintiffs' decision regarding the husband's presence
during childbirth did not attain this level of significance.93 He declared that the decision to bear or not to bear a child is of substantially greater magnitude than the choice of method for the delivery.
Stevens manifested a reluctance to substitute the court's judgment
for the professional judgment of the hospital staff and noted that a
verdict for plaintiffs would be inconsistent with the exclusion of
relatives from other medical procedures.
In Fitzgerald Justice Stevens recognizes the right of privacy
regarding decisions on substantive matters of health care, such as
contraception and abortion, but he declines to extend the right to
procedural matters involving specific medical practices and techniques. His development of this substantive-procedural dichotomy
focuses on the magnitude of the deprivation as the determinative
factor. Stevens' magnitude test limits the protection afforded by the
right of privacy to fundamental matters of conscience dignified by
history and tradition. His conclusion that obstetrical procedure does
not attain this level of significance is a rejection of Justice Douglas'
statement that the right of privacy includes the right to choose one's
personal physician and to have that physician apply his own
90. The LaMaze method involves a prenatal training program that enables the couple
to function as a team during delivery, with the husband supplying physical and emotional
support to his wife. Id. at 716 n.2.
91. Id. at 721.
92. "In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
93. Stevens emphasized the differing opinions within the medical profession on the
advisability of the husband's presence during delivery. 523 F.2d at 721.
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professional standards. 4 Although Justice Stevens' differentiation
between substance and procedure reflects an innovative analysis,
his characterization of the instant plaintiffs' claim as merely a
choice of procedural technique displays a lack of sensitivity to the
psychological and emotional importance of the moment of childbirth to both mother and father. This analysis seems to equate
impairment of procedural choices with deprivations of small magnitude. Stevens thus suggests a means for limiting all aspects of the
protection afforded by the right of privacy.
G.

ConstitutionalRights of Juveniles

The Supreme Court's holding in In re Gault that juvenile court
proceedings must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment95 spawned a series of lower court opinions that moved
toward the extension of due process guarantees to juveniles and
more closely examined statutory procedures concerning juveniles.99
The opinions of Justice Stevens take a pragmatic balancing approach in this area. He seeks to insure procedural fairness in juvenile proceedings, yet he sometimes takes a paternalistic attitude
when considering rules prescribed for juvenile conduct.
Stevens' first comment on the substance of juvenile rights came
97 discussed also in
in his dissenting opinion in Arnold v. Carpenter,
Part E, above. The majority opinion enjoined enforcement of a high
school dress code that a committee of students, teachers, and administrators had formulated and a majority of the students regulated had adopted.9" Stevens took the view that parents and teachers are necessarily partners in the process of requiring the young to
conform to the manners of their elders: "[T]o the extent that parents and teachers stand together, a child has no enforceable constitutional right to do his own thing." 9 Stevens felt, however, that a
parent's support of his child's attempts at nonconformity are enti94. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 219-20 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
562 (1966).
96. See, e.g., S. DAVIs, RmITs OF JUVENILES 177 (1974).
97. 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of this case in the context of the first
amendment see notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
98. The Seventh Circuit, in earlier decisions, had recognized that "[t]he right to wear
one's hair at any length or in any desired manner is an ingredient of personal freedom
protected by the United States Constitution." Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
Defendants sought to uphold the instant dress code on the strength of its adoption by a
majority of the students.
99. 459 F.2d at 944.
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tled to respect, and that the instant dress code accommodated the
parent's interest: "I find nothing offensive in a dress code which
requires conformity unless excused by a child's parents."'," And he
expressed indignance that the case was even before the court:
I would not open the federal courts to a parent who, by simply giving the school
administrators appropriate evidence of his consent, has available an adequate
remedy to protect his child's interest in nonconformity or in a particular mode
of appearance."'1

While Stevens took a paternalistic attitude 112 toward the Arnold
dress code and refused to characterize the issue as one of major
constitutional dimension, he carefully scrutinized cases involving
the actual physical liberty of juveniles and applied a classical "due
process," "equal protection" analysis to them. His majority opinion
in Vann v.Scott"°3 squarely addressed the question of juvenile rights
in delinquency proceedings. Plaintiffs in that case were juveniles
who had run away from families or foster homes more than once and
who were therefore subject to classification as "delinquents" under
Illinois law. 04 Under the law "delinquents" could be committed to
the Illinois Department of Corrections unless commitment was not
in the best interest of the minor and the public. Plaintiffs argued
that the classification of runaways as delinquents violated the equal
protection clause and that punishing runaways in the same way as
juvenile felons constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Stevens denied the equal protection attack, stating that although classification as a delinquent might stigmatize a runaway in
the same way as those guilty of serious crime, a rational basis for
the classification existed because runaways might need the same
kind of rehabilitative treatment as youths guilty of serious crimes.
Stevens found, however, that some aspects of the correctional detention constituted cruel and unusual punishment of runaway "delinquents." Citing In re Gault,"°5 he repudiated the state attorney
general's assertion that a minor child had only a right to a responsible adult custodian and no right to liberty. Stevens further stated:
[w]hatever differences of opinion there might be in specific cases, we think
the law is clear that a state may not act arbitrarily with children merely
100. Id. at 945.
101. Id.
102. "Just as the majority must learn to tolerate the nonconformist, so must he learn
to tolerate the transient customs of his elders." Id.
103. 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972).
104. The classification came by way of an adjudicatory hearing, no aspect of which was
challenged on constitutional grounds by plaintiffs. Id. at 1239.
105. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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because they are children. And while a parent, as legal custodian of his child,
may be able to restrict his child's liberty with impunity. .. ,it does not follow
that a state has the same unfettered rights as a parent merely because it
becomes legal custodian of the child. The state, even when acting in a "private" capacity, is always subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.0'

Justice Stevens' next opportunity to consider the matter of juvenile rights arose in United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin. 7
Four juveniles confined to the Illinois Industrial School for Boys
sought release on equal protection grounds because they had already
been confined for longer than the maximum sentence authorized by
law for adults convicted of similar offenses. Stevens noted that Illinois law permitted incarceration of a juvenile delinquent until his
twenty-first birthday unless he demonstrated that an earlier release
would serve his best interest. Stevens then denied the equal protection claim, stating that the potential difference between maximum
length of sentence for a juvenile offender and that for an adult
convicted of the same offense does not invalidate the statutory distinction between adults and juveniles since offsetting benefits generally result in favored treatment for the youthful offender." 8
United States ex rel. Bombacino v. Bensinger"' is Justice Stevens' most recent opinion on the matter of juvenile rights. The
question presented was whether a state statute violates due process
by permitting a juvenile court judge to transfer juveniles from his
court to a court of ordinary jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing or a statement of reasons. Stevens stated that neither Kent v.
United States' 0 nor fundamental fairness required the prosecutor to
show probable cause that the youth had committed a criminal offense because the grand jury had to find probable cause in order to
issue an indictment and that procedure adequately protected the
youthful offender's rights."' Regarding the absence of the juvenile
judge's statement of reasons for the transfer, Stevens stated that the
need for such a statement in any procedural contest must be evaluated in light of the function such a statement would perform. In
other contexts-denial of parole or denial of a Selective Service
106. 467 F.2d at 1240 n.15.
107. 472 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1973).
108. Id. at 102-03.
109. 498 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
110. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that a juvenile court in the District of Columbia could
not waive jurisdiction over a minor charged with a criminal offense without first granting the
minor a hearing and that the basic requirements of due process and fairness must be satisfied
in such proceeding).
111. "Due process is, of course, a flexible concept; the procedural safeguards which are
required differ in different circumstances ..
" 498 F.2d at 878 n.12.
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classification, for example-such a statement may serve as a basis
for appeal. That function was not served here, Stevens reasoned,
because no right to appeal existed. Further, the youth's representation by competent counsel made such a statement less necessary.
Finally, although Stevens acknowledged that a statement of reasons
might reduce the risks of arbitrariness, he refused to find such a
statement constitutionally required.
Justice Stevens' opinions in juvenile law reflect both his pragmatism and evenhandedness in resolving questions of competing
societal interests. He has demonstrated that he will deal firmly yet
fairly with juvenile offenders, and while he is quick to defend the
constitutional rights of juveniles as a broad principle, he seems
content in the specific case to show great deference to the state's
interests in regulating juvenile behavior as parens patriae.Stevens'
dissent in Arnold most plainly illustrates his pragmatism; Stevens
complained that unaccommodating parents of a nonconformist
youth should not be allowed in federal court when minimal effort
by the parents could exempt their son from compliance with the
challenged school dress code. In Vann, Stevens denied an equal
protection claim that runaways should not be classified as delinquents in the same way as juvenile felons, reasoning that the runaways would benefit from state rehabilitation programs. Stevens balanced the costs and benefits to a juvenile of incarceration for a
longer period than his adult counterpart charged with the same
offense and concluded that the juvenile's best interests would be
served by continued state supervision. The holding in Bensinger
represents a classic balancing approach: Stevens held that a juvenile judge is neither required to hold an evidentiary hearing nor give
a statement of reasons for his decision to transfer a juvenile to a
court of ordinary jurisdiction; Stevens reasoned that other procedures properly preserved the interests asserted by the plaintiff.
In sum, Stevens' opinions in the area of juvenile rights reveal
that his conclusions of constitutional law are grounded in practical
considerations which are the result of a fair-minded balancing approach. He demonstrates his paternalism in the view that the state
often knows best how to fulfill the needs and protect the interests
of misguided youths, and for that reason shows great deference to
the interests of the state in performing its role as parenspatriae.He
unambiguously asserts, however, that a juvenile has due process
rights which are protected by the Constitution and will not grant
unfettered discretion to governmental authorities1 to12 "act arbitrarily
with children merely because they are children. 1
112.

Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240 n.15 (7th Cir. 1972).
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CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In the area of criminal constitutional law, Justice Stevens has
written interesting opinions on the reasonableness of searches and
seizures, the requirement of standing to challenge searches and seizures, fifth amendment confessions, the sixth amendment right to
counsel, the due process rights of prisoners, and pretrial identification procedures. As the reader will discover, Justice Stevens' approach in these cases is hard to define. Continuing themes include
the Justice's emphasis on the facts of the particular case, his general
readiness to defer on questions of fact to the fact finder, and his use
of a balancing test to determine whether the interest of the defendant is sufficiently important to outweigh that of the government.
The opinions will be discussed in the order stated above.
A. Searches and Seizures
In appraising the reasonableness of a search and seizure,
Justice Stevens' decisions reflect a balancing of the individual's
expectation of privacy, the government's ability to anticipate and
avoid the search and seizure, and the social interest that the search
was intended to vindicate. The result of this balancing test is that
Justice Stevens' fourth amendment cases evidence a strict examination of all the circumstances that might justify the government's
invasion of the defendant's privacy. Justice Stevens has used this
balancing approach in fourth amendment cases dealing with warrantless searches, a prisoner's fourth amendment rights, and consent searches.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a search warrant
is not required in certain "exigent circumstances." Under Chimel
v. California,"3 warrantless searches incident to an arrest are permissible if limited to the defendant's person and the area within his
immediate control.' In Warden v. Hayden"5 the Court held that a
police officer's reasonable belief that his life or the lives of others
are in danger constitutes exigent circumstances justifying a war"' 7 excused police officers from a
rantless search."' Ker v. California
California notice-demand statute if they reasonably believed that
entry without notice would prevent the destruction of evidence.
In United States v. Rosselli,"'8 Justice Stevens, writing for the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 760.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Id. at 298-99.
374 U.S. 23 (1963).
506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974).
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majority, used a test stricter than the "reasonable belief of emergency" rationale and required the government to explain why it had
neither attempted to obtain a warrant nor placed the defendant's
apartment under surveillance." ' In Rosselli, government agents
having probable cause to believe that the defendant possessed a
large quantity of marijuana proceeded to defendant's apartment.
After the agents knocked on the apartment door, they heard a scuffling movement inside. The agents, upon hearing the noise, kicked
in the door and entered. The government agents testified that they
believed the defendant was about to destroy the evidence. Justice
Stevens answered that the necessity of making an immediate search
must be examined " . . . during the entire period after they [the

police officers] had a right to obtain a warrant and not merely from
the moment when they knocked at the front door.'

2 0°

Reasoning that

the possibility of the destruction of evidence was foreseeable, Justice Stevens found that the government did not meet its burden of
anticipating and avoiding the need to rely on an emergency justification.1 2' Stevens added that the emergency involved no risk of dan-

ger to the lives of the officers or others and that society's interest in
the destruction of the contraband would have been vindicated even
without the warrantless entry.
In Bonner v. Coughlin,'22 Justice Stevens stated that incarceration does not necessarily strip a person of all constitutional protection. In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that a prisoner is entitled to prove an alleged taking of property constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Bonner alleged that prison guards seized a
copy of his trial transcript while conducting an authorized institutional shakedown. The district court held that Bonner had no right
to relief against the guards because their reliance on a valid prison
regulation established a good faith defense. In the Seventh Circuit's
majority opinion, Stevens rejected the proposition that the fourth
amendment does not apply to searches of a prisoner and his cell, but
recognized that random shakedowns pursuant to administrative
regulations may be reasonable within the meaning of the amendment because a prisoner does not share the same fourth amendment
rights enjoyed by the unincarcerated members of society.'2 3 The case
119. Id. at 630.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 631.
122. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975).
123. Justice Stevens rejected Bonner's argument that the prison regulation authorizing
routine institutional shakedowns was unconstitutional on its face. Stevens asserted that the
Court need not find the statute unconstitutional on its face because Bonner had stated a
specific fourth amendment claim regarding the seizure of his trial transcript. Id. at 1314-15.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:125

was remanded to the district court to afford the prisoner an opportunity to litigate the "reasonableness" of the seizure. In dicta, Stevens agreed that prisoners have the right to enjoy substantial religious freedom, to be free from invidious discrimination based on
race, and to claim the protection of the due process clause.'
In United States v. Dichiarinte,215 the Seventh Circuit recognized that a consent search is constitutional if the consent was
voluntarily given,' but held that the government had exceeded the
bounds of defendant's consent. Defendant contended that the police
exceeded the scope of his consent to search his apartment, arguing
that he had only consented to a search for narcotics. In the search,
the police found personal papers that were instrumental in convicting defendant on tax evasion charges. After two evidentiary hearings, the trial court determined that defendant had consented to an
unlimited search of his entire apartment. Justice Stevens dissented,
arguing that the majority erred in retrying the fact question before
the court. In light of the two evidentiary hearings held by the district court judge, Stevens maintained that the appeals court should
defer to the district court's fact determination.
The three cases discussed above clearly inoticate Justice Stevens' tendency to scrutinize carefully all of the circumstances in a
search and seizure case before deciding whether the government's
actions were reasonable. Stevens has rejected the application of
narrow rules in examining fourth amendment cases and has preferred to balance the defendant's interest in privacy against the
government's needs in a criminal investigation and society's interest
in the object of the search. In Rosselli, Justice Stevens refused to
apply a blanket emergency justification for warrantless searches.
Instead, he used a balancing test to find that it was not reasonable
to sanction the particular warrantless search in question. Likewise,
in Bonner, Justice Stevens rejected the strict rule that a prisoner
has no fourth amendment rights. He recognized the obvious need for
surveillance and control in the prison context and balanced that
need against the prisoner's interest in privacy. By deferring to the
original fact finder in Dichiarinte,Justice Stevens maintained his
position that fourth amendment cases should be decided through a
careful case-by-case analysis of all the facts. In the same manner
that he balanced the competing interests in Rosselli and Bonner,
Justice Stevens looked to see which testimony the district court
124. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Lee
v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
125. 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971).
126. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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judge deemed credible and which he did not. This strong expression
of deference to the trial judge's factual determinations reinforces the
conclusion that in the fourth amendment area Justice Stevens is
committed to a case-by-case analysis of both facts and competing
policies.
B.

Standing to Raise FourthAmendment Claims

While on the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens considered
whether a defendant charged with a possessory crime has "automatic" standing to seek suppression of evidence unlawfully seized.
Although standing to contest the reasonableness of a search and
seizure generally does not exist unless the challenging party owns
or has some other interest in the property searched,127 the Supreme
Court has held that a defendant charged with a possessory offense
has standing to challenge the seizure of the contraband without
showing that the search or seizure violated any personal right of
privacy. In United States v. Jeffers,1 8 the Court held with little
discussion that a defendant charged with possession of narcotics
had standing to suppress drugs unlawfully seized although he
lacked a property interest in the premises searched. Elaborating on
this rule in Jones v. United States,12 the Court held that a defendant charged with possession is not required to make a preliminary
showing of an interest in the contraband in order to establish standing to contest its unlawful seizure. The Court limited the Jones case
in Brown v. United States,13 which held that a defendant had no
automatic standing to contest a search and seizure when the possessory offense charged did not include as an essential element possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and
seizure.
Justice Stevens propounded a unique approach to the problem
of standing in United States v. Lisk.3 1 In Lisk, defendant was indicted for possession of a bomb on September 25, 1972. On that
date, while retaining a proprietary interest in the bomb, defendant
placed it in the trunk of an automobile owned by a third party. On
September 30, police illegally searched the car and seized the bomb.
Defendant sought to prevent admission of the bomb at trial, and the
district court held he had automatic standing under Jones to object
127. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (affirming the conviction of
codefendants whose fourth amendment rights were not violated).
128. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
129. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
130. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
131. 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975).
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to the seizure. The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held the doctrine of automatic standing under Brown inapplicable because the government did not base its case on defendant's
possession of the bomb at the time of the search and seizure.13 The
court held further that ownership of the bomb conferred standing
on defendant to object only to the seizure and not to the search.
Because defendant had no standing to contest the search, Stevens
reasoned, the seizure was analogous to seizure of evidence under the
plain view rule and therefore was lawful. On petition for rehearing
Stevens rejected defendant's contention that under Jeffers an interest in the seized property confers standing to challenge the search,
and he suggested two other possible bases for the Jeff ers holding:
first, that Jeffers' interest in the premises as a regular invitee was
sufficient to challenge the search and, second, that the search was
133
"directed at" Jeffers.
At a minimum, Lisk indicates that Justice Stevens is apt to
scrutinize carefully the problem of standing to contest fourth
amendment violations. The Supreme Court recently has suggested
willingness to reexamine the area of automatic standing. 134 Although
the defendant usually has an interest in both the property seized
and the premises searched, splitting search and seizure in the area
of automatic standing may make considerable sense, since in those
cases the defendant's property is seized but his privacy is not invaded. The distinction, if adopted by the Supreme Court, will eliminate standing to raise fourth amendment claims for the defendant
inadvertently incriminated by the unlawful search of another's
property.
C.

The Fifth Amendment and Miranda

Justice Stevens' decisions in the area of rights guaranteed by
the fifth amendment and Mirandav. Arizona 35 evidence an attempt
to balance the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
against the needs inherent in a particular government procedure.
Justice Stevens agrees with Justice Rehnquist's position in
Michigan v. Tucker that the procedural safeguards in Miranda are
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but are only
recommended measures to protect one's privilege against self132. Id. at 230 n.2.
133. Stevens considered and distinguished language in both Jones and Brown which
suggested that an interest in seized property alone conveys standing. Id. at 233 n.5.
134. In Brown the Supreme Court expressed doubt in the continuing vitality of the
concept of automatic standing. 411 U.S. at 229.
135. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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incrimination.'36 Justice Stevens' decisions also reflect his belief
that Miranda'steachings must be applied on a case-by-case basis.
In that context Stevens has considered the problem of defining custody, whether the harmless error doctrine may apply in a proper
case, and whether failure to give notice to defendant's counsel violates Miranda.
While Mirandav. Arizona requires that a defendant be advised
of certain enumerated rights before interrogation, 137 this requirement obtains only in a custodial situation. Miranda defines custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officials after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'1 8 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority in United States v. Oliver, 39 held
that the defendant was entitled to Mirandawarnings before an interview with Internal Revenue agents investigating a possible criminal violation of the tax laws. 4 ' The defendant had been the object
of a tax investigation for several months when Internal Revenue
agents interviewed him in their offices. Prior to any questioning, the
government agents advised the suspect that he was not in physical
custody and that he did not have to answer any incriminating questions.'' Later, the government predicated its case on certain statements made by defendant in the interview. Justice Stevens noted
that the statement read to the suspect by the agents was clearly
inadequate if Miranda applied. Adopting the "deprivation of freedom of action test" used in Miranda, Justice Stevens decided that
the application of Miranda turned on more than the presence of
physical custody.12 Thus Stevens required the giving of Miranda
warnings if the practical result of the interrogation is to create in
the suspect's mind a compulsion to make disclosures and if the
investigation has focused on the suspect for the purpose of securing
a conviction.
Justice Stevens has also considered the applicability of the
harmless error doctrine to admission of evidence obtained in viola-3
tion of Miranda. The Supreme Court in Chapman v. California1
136. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
137. The Court in Miranda laid down certain procedural rules to safeguard the privilege
against self-incrimination. These procedures must be adhered to in absence of". . other
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
. ." Id. at 467.
silence.
138. Id. at 444.
139. 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
140. Id.at 304.
141. Id. at 303 n.5.
142. Id. at 304-05.
143. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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applied a harmless error standard to incriminating statements obtained in violation of the Miranda guidelines and used in the case
in chief. The Court held that the introduction of illegally seized
evidence was prejudicial and not harmless error if a reasonable possibility exists that the evidence contributed in any way to the conviction. In Harringtonv. California,' however, the Supreme Court
held that the evidence pointing to the petitioner's guilt was so
"overwhelming" that even though a reasonable possibility existed
that the illegally obtained evidence contributed to the conviction,
48 the Seventh
the error was harmless. 4 ' In United States v. Matos,1
Circuit applied the Chapman test in holding that the admission of
certain evidence violated the defendant's fifth amendment rights
and constituted reversible error. The district court had admitted
testimony that after his apprehension the defendant indicated a
desire not to make a statement. The majority in Matos decided they
could not reasonably conclude that the improper testimony did not
contribute to Matos' conviction and reversed. In dissent, Justice
Stevens maintained that the improper testimony was merely
cumulative and that the error was harmless in light of repeated
testimony that the defendant remained silent at times he would
have spoken had he intended to return the stolen goods. Stevens
candidly stated that he was not declaring that no juror could have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt had the
improper comment not been admitted. 7 Instead, he argued that in
the context of all the evidence before the court the questioned testimony was relatively unimportant and, therefore, harmless.
Finally, Justice Stevens has considered whether interrogation
of a defendant without first giving notice to his counsel violates the
defendant's constitutional rights. If government agents know a defendant is represented by an attorney, obtaining testimonial evidence from the defendant without notice either to his attorney or
himself has been held to violate the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination.' Some question existed after Massiah v. United
States' whether the fifth amendment required notice to defendant's attorney before a statement of any kind could be elicited from
the defendant. The majority of federal courts have taken the position that the police may question a prisoner known to be represented
144. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
145. Id. at 254.
146. 444 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1971).
147. Id. at 1077.
148. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
149. Id.
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by counsel without notifying his lawyer of their presence so long as
the prisoner deliberately and knowledgeably waives counsel's assistance.'50
In United States v. Springer,'5 1 the Seventh Circuit decided
that interrogation of a defendant without notice to his lawyer does
not violate the fifth amendment if the defendant voluntarily foregoes the assistance of counsel. Two agents of the prosecutor visited
the defendant in his prison cell without notice to the defense counsel
and elicited a written confession to pending federal bank robbery
and conspiracy charges. In a curt dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that he considered the prosecutor's action unethical and
a violation of the defendant's right to procedural due process.
Justice Stevens' Mirandadecisions indicate a case-by-case balancing of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
against other evidence in the case and the government's need for a
particular procedure. In Oliver, Stevens balanced the nature of the
government's inquiry and the defendant's understanding of his obligation to respond against the practical effect of compelling the defendant to make certain disclosures. A comprehensive analysis of
the facts resulted in Justice Stevens' holding that Mirandawarnings
may be required even when the defendant is not in physical custody.
In Matos, this same case-by-case determination is evident in Stevens' consideration of the impact of improper testimony in the context of all the evidence. Concluding that the error was harmless,
Stevens refused to apply the strict Chapman rule and instead
weighed the effect of the improper testimony against the effect of
other overwhelming evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt. Finally, in Springer, Stevens measured the value of the prosecutor's
questionable conduct against the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination and concluded that prosecutorial interrogation without notice to defense counsel is unethical and violates due process.
Thus, as in the fourth amendment area, Justice Stevens examines
in detail all policy considerations in a case and weighs them before
determining whether a particular procedure violates the defendant's
rights under Miranda.
D.

Right to Counsel

Justice Stevens considered two types of right to counsel problems while on the Seventh Circuit: whether the right to counsel
150. See United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836
(1973); Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
151. 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
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attaches at a particular stage of a criminal proceeding and whether
assistance of counsel is effective within the meaning of the sixth
amendment. In Mempa v. Rhay'5 2 the Supreme Court held that
deferred sentencing at a probation revocation hearing is a "critical
stage" affording defendant a right to counsel. The Seventh Circuit
considered the applicability of Mempa to a parole release hearing
in Ganz v. Bensinger.'53
In Ganz, an indigent prisoner claimed a right to counsel at a
parole release hearing, 54' urging that the hearing was the practical
equivalent of sentencing and a "critical stage" in the proceedings
because it actually determined the amount of time served. Announcing the opinion of the court, Justice Stevens agreed that the
hearing was in a sense critical but rejected plaintiff's claim because
the hearing was not a stage of a criminal prosecution. Stevens distinguished Mempa v. Rhay, holding that the right to counsel at a
hearing determining the length of imprisonment is limited to hearings of a judicial nature.
Decisions on whether a criminal defendant has received effective assistance of counsel are peculiarly fact based, making
generalization difficult. In Nichols v. Gagnon,'55 appointed counsel
advised the appellate court by letter that he could find no merit to
the appeal of his client's conviction and detailed possible points of
error in the letter, demonstrating their insufficiency. Stevens found
that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. Stevens rejected the idea that effective assistance requires appointed
counsel to brief every arguably appealable issue along with his request to withdraw. 5' In Macon v. Lash,'57 petitioner lost his right to
appeal a murder conviction because appointed counsel failed to file
a timely motion for a new trial. Writing for the court, Stevens held
152. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
153. 480 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1973).
154. Plaintiff also claimed a right to counsel under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Stevens summarily rejected the due process argument,
citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no right to counsel at a probation revocation
hearing). Plaintiff's equal protection argument, based on the nonindigent's right to retain
counsel at a parole release hearing, was also rejected. Stevens observed that lack of counsel
does not necessarily bar the indigent's opportunity to obtain parole. See also Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding that pre-indictment identification is not a stage of criminal
prosecution).
155. 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971).
156. Appellant argued that since nonindigents could retain counsel to argue even meritless appeals, appointed counsel should provide the same quantity of representation. Stevens
observed: "Every defendant does not have the constitutional right to be represented by
Clarence Darrow. Perfect equality between indigents and nonindigents. . . is impossible to
achieve." Id. at 472.
157. 458 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1972).
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that "petitioner's right to appeal could not be forfeited by the critical error of inexperienced court-appointed counsel . .. "' Finally,
in Wimberley v. Laird,'58 Stevens held that the failure of trial counsel to argue the defense of insanity in a murder trial or to offer other
mitigating evidence did not constitute a denial of effective assistance because counsel's failure to raise the defense could be construed as a trial tactic.
Conclusions based on such a limited amount of material are, of
necessity, limited. The Ganz case indicates a disinclination to extend the right to counsel beyond its present boundaries. In the effective assistance cases, Stevens seems reluctant to interfere with tactical decisions at trial but does not permit forfeiture of important
rights by minimally qualified counsel.
E.

Due Process Rights of Prisoners

In United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,' ° Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, considered the relationship between the
due process requirements of Morrissey v. Brewer' and certain aspects of internal prison administration. In Morrissey, a parole revocation case, the Supreme Court held that one "condemned to suffer
a grievous loss" of any interest "within the contemplation of the
'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment" is
entitled to some measure of due process.' Appellants in Miller
argued that some safeguards of procedural due process are required
8 3 or punitive
before statutory "good time" credits may be revoked"
64
segregation imposed.' Although persuaded that Morrissey stands
for the broad principle that "liberty protected by the due process
clause may-indeed must to some extent-coexist with legal custody pursuant to conviction,"'8 5 Stevens maintained that procedural
safeguards attach only when the disciplinary actions taken by
prison officials inflict a "grievous loss" on the prisoner. Stevens then
158. Id. at 950.
159. 472 F.2d 923 (7th Cir. 1973).
160. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973). For further discussion of this case see notes 326-30
infra and accompanying text.
161. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
162. Id. at 481.
163. Good time credit systems may reduce the maximum sentence served or accelerate
the parole eligibility date based on the prisoner's "good behavior."

164. One of the cases consolidated on appeal concerned liability of prison officials for
failing to segregate a dangerous prisoner from plaintiff and will not be discussed in text. 479
F.2d at 719-21.
165. 479 F.2d at 712.
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found that revocation of good time credits 6 ' and punitive segregation 16 7 constitute grievous losses. Having determined, however, that
Morrissey mandates some measure of due process, Stevens pared
down the six procedural safeguards required by Morrissey for parole
revocation 16 8 to three requirements for good time revocation and
punitive segregation: advance written notice; an opportunity to be
heard and to present witnesses; and an impartial decision maker.
Stevens deferred to state prison officials to determine the applicability of other Morrissey safeguards.
As the dissent points out, this is a restrictive application of
Morrissey. ' Stevens cautiously limited constitutional change in
this area of criminal procedure. Since he did not state any reasons
for restriction of Morrissey other than deference to the expertise of
prison officials, one may surmise that Justice Stevens will not favor
extension of additional procedural rights to prisoners in post conviction proceedings.
F.

PretrialIdentification Procedures

In United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges,7 ' Justice Stevens held
that admission of evidence derived from a showup identification
does not violate due process if the identification is reliable. Petitioner contended that the due process clause requires per se exclusion of evidence derived from an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure' 71 and, alternatively, that the police station showup
166. One appellant had lost a total of 21 months of good time credits through disciplinary proceedings.
167. Stevens found that punitive segregation was a substantial deprivation of liberty
compared with normal prison status.
168. The Morrissey Court held that minimal requirements of due process in parole
revocation include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of
evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses . . . ; (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body . . . ; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
408 U.S. at 489.
169. 479 F.2d at 721 (Swygert, C.J., dissenting in part).
170. 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975). In a limited grant of certiorari the Supreme Court in
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), considered Kirby's sixth amendment challenge to the
pre-indictment showup, holding that the right to counsel does not attach prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings.
171. The Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers considered whether such a per se exclusionary rule should be adopted to deter police from using a less reliable procedure but did not
reach the question since the confrontation in Biggers took place before Stovall u. Denno and
put police on notice of the new weight to be given suggestive procedures. 409 U.S. 188, 19899 (1972).
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in question deprived him of due process of law.1 2 Deciding both
issues against petitioner, Stevens affirmed the denial of a writ of
habeas corpus.
Although Stevens found that a per se exclusionary rule for
suggestive procedures would be desirable for a number of reasons
and quoted dicta in Biggers suggesting that the Supreme Court
might favor its adoption, 173 he held that such a rule could not be
imposed on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Stevens noted that the Supreme Court twice
had held that admitting evidence of a showup did not necessarily
violate requirements of due process.'74 Assuming that trial judges
could distinguish an unconstitutional identification procedure by
applying the totality of the circumstances standard set out by the
Supreme Court,17 5 Stevens found that the only basis for a per se
exclusionary rule-deterrence of undesirable police conduct-did
not give the court the constitutional power to impose the rule on
states in the Seventh Circuit.
Stevens next considered whether the totality of the circumstances in the instant case disclosed a deprivation of due process. Stevens isolated three factors that determine whether an identification
procedure violates due process: suggestiveness; lack of justification;
and reliability. Applying the factors to the instant case, Stevens
recognized that the showup procedure was inherently suggestive
and that the police had offered no justification for the use of this
procedure rather than the less suggestive lineup. Stevens, however,
found that these two facts do not deprive the defendant of due
process if the identification is reliable, 7 1 and he concluded that the
identification in the instant case was sufficiently reliable.
In Kirby, Justice Stevens conservatively construed the consti172. The Court in Kirby v. Illinois reaffirmed the validity of a due process attack on
suggestive identification procedures but reserved the question of "whether there might have
been a deprivation of due process in the particularized circumstances of this case . . . for
inquiry in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." 406 U.S. at 691 n.8.
173. The Court noted:
The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence of unnecessarily suggestive confrontations
would be to deter the police from using a less reliable procedure where a more reliable
one may be available, and would not be based on the assumption that in every instance
the admission of evidence of such a confrontation offends due process.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
174. 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
175. 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
176. In Biggers, the Supreme Court held that although the showup was gratuitously
suggestive, defendant had not been deprived of due process since the identification was
reliable. The Court listed a number of factors useful in evaluating reliability, which were used
by Justice Stevens in the instant case. 510 F.2d at 404.
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tutional power to impose a new type of exclusionary rule on the
states under the due process clause. It is worth noting that Stevens
emphasized the deterrent value of such a rule without mention of
any argument concerning judicial integrity, long a factor cited by
the Supreme Court in support of the exclusionary rule for fourth
amendment violations.1 17 It is possible that Justice Stevens will continue to follow this analysis in considering the exclusion of evidence
under the fourth and fifth amendments. Stevens adhered to the
approach of the Biggers decision in his disposition of Kirby's claim
of a specific due process violation. Although resolution of the issue
therefore turned on the reliability of the identification under the
particular facts, the holding itself may have some predictive value
since the identification was not clearly reliable or unreliable. Kirby
indicates that Justice Stevens will uphold a due process attack on
showup identifications only in the egregious case.
G.

Double Jeopardy

While Justice Stevens was on the Seventh Circuit he participated in several cases presenting difficult questions of double jeopardy. Under the greater weight of authority, jeopardy attaches in a
jury trial when the jury has been impaneled and sworn 78 and in a
nonjury trial when the court begins to hear evidence.' 79 It is well
settled that an acquittal cannot be appealed without putting the
defendant twice in jeopardy, even though the acquittal is not followed by any judgment.' 0
In United States v. Ponto,'"' Stevens disagreed with the holding
of the majority that the dismissal of an indictment operated as an
acquittal on the merits, barring a government appeal. Defendant
was indicted for failure to submit to induction into the Armed Services. The majority reasoned that the district court's dismissal of the
indictment based on defendant's objections to the local board's classification procedure was an evaluation of an affirmative defense on
the merits and should therefore have the effect of an acquittal.
Justice Stevens urged that the double jeopardy clause did not apply
because the preliminary proceedings had not been considered by
either party as part of the trial and because no jury had been waived
177. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But cf. United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974).
178. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
179. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 610 (1936).
180. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1970).
181. 454 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.), rehearing en banc, 454 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1971).
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or impaneled.'82
In United States v. Walker,' 3 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, considered again whether dismissal of an indictment operated as an acquittal that would bar a government appeal under the
double jeopardy clause. The district court dismissed an indictment
charging the defendant with transportation of a firearm in interstate
commerce'84 after discovery disclosed that the prior transportation
in commerce was unrelated to defendant's possession. Stevens distinguished Ponto, noting that dismissal in the instant case was
based on an inaccurate charge and not on an affirmative defense as
in Ponto, and concluded that the dismissal did not operate as an
acquittal on the merits.
In United States v. Haygood,'8 5 Stevens again considered
whether jeopardy could attach prior to trial. In sentencing appellant
on the first of two related charges pending before different district
judges, the judge in the first case considered and relied on the pending charge in the second. Appellant contended that the double jeopardy clause barred further prosecution of the second case. Holding
that the judge's consideration of the pending charge did not place
appellant in jeopardy, Stevens maintained:
Appellant's claim that procedural error was nevertheless committed is
supported by the policies which undergird the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. . . . The constitutional protection is intended to
forestall such unfairness and to give a defendant the right to one final disposition of pending charge. '

The court disposed of the case on the ground that defendant
had failed to make timely objection to this procedural error.
Haygood lends support to the hypothesis that Justice Stevens
is not unsympathetic to the policies and problems of double jeopardy claims. Ponto and Walker, however, indicate that Stevens is
disinclined to extend the protections of double jeopardy unless jeopardy has attached in the traditional sense-impaneling of a jury or
hearing of the evidence in a nonjury trial.
182. Stevens supported his argument by reference to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which do not provide for the entry of a judgment of acquittal until "after the
evidence on either side is closed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
183. 489 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 982 (1974).
184. Title VII, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 1202(a), 18-App.
U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1970).
185. 502 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1974).
186. Id. at 169.
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FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW

The Supreme Court devotes a major portion of its time to deciding cases arising under federal statutory law. The diversity and
complexity of these cases are so well recognized that commentary
is perhaps superfluous. Justice Stevens has not written a large number of opinions in any single statutory area. He has written on the
subjects of securities law, antitrust law, federal tax law, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, labor law, and the award of attorney
fees. In most of these areas, with a notable exception in securities
law, he has not considered particularly novel or difficult questions.
Nevertheless, his opinions do lend insight to the ways in which he
approaches construction of statutes. His opinions will be discussed
in the order stated above.
A.

Securities Law

8 7 in the area
Justice Stevens' Seventh Circuit opinions"
of federal securities law involve many of the most frequently litigated
securities issues, including the scope of an underwriter's liability
under Rule 10b-5, the definition of a security, liability for short
swing profits under section 16(b), and standing under Rule 10b-5 (a
pre-Blue Chip188 case). The Supreme Court has stressed that in
analyzing alleged securities law violations courts should concentrate
on the substance rather than the form of the transaction. 8 ' Justice
Stevens has used this approach to fashion remedies that take into
consideration the character of the parties, the degree of the injury
sustained, the nature of the specific transaction, and legislative and
judicial policies.
In Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co. 190 Stevens appears to extend
substantially an underwriter's liability under Rule 10b-5 for the
fraud of his issuer. Nuveen 1 entered the commercial paper business
in 1968 by acquiring a broker who represented forty issuers, one of
which was Winter & Hirsch, Inc. (WH). Nuveen reviewed WH's
semiannual financial statements, which the certified public ac187. Of the seven opinions available, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in five,
dissented in one, and concurred in one.
188. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), approved the rule
of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 343 U.S. 956 (1952),
that plaintiff must be a purchaser or a seller of securities to initiate an action under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
189. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
190. 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975).
191. Nuveen operated 17 branch offices in various locations throughout the United
States. It dealt primarily in tax exempt securities.
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counting firm of Liber, Bleiweis & Company prepared, and it employed a credit analyst to spend a day at WH's offices examining
receivables and collection procedures. Since this investigation exposed no problems, Nuveen began underwriting and selling WH
commercial paper. 92 Some months later, Nuveen"13 again reviewed
WH's latest certified financial statements and received on inquiry
either neutral or favorable credit reports from ten banks who had
extended credit to WH. In 1970 two lenders insisted that a firm
other than Liber, Bleiweis audit WH. The new accountants discovered that WH had not filed federal income tax returns for 1969, that
they could not reconcile the general ledger with the net worth statement prepared by Liber, Bleiweis, that assets were overstated by
$14 million and liabilities understated by $1.75 million, and that
WH and Liber, Bleiweis had falsified records for ten years to conceal
WH's hopeless insolvency. Nuveen immediately stopped selling WH
paper.'94 Three weeks later, the plaintiff initiated this class action
alleging that Nuveen 9 5 had violated its duty as an underwriter
under the federal securities laws by selling WH commercial paper
without having first made a reasonable investigation of the issuer.,"
Authoring the Seventh Circuit opinion, Justice Stevens affirmed the lower court's conclusion that Nuveen had violated
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Stevens stated that the standard for liability under Rule 10b-5 could
be phrased differently in different circumstances'97 and expressly
refused to decide whether a generally applicable standard of culpability in Rule 10b-5 cases exists. He emphasized Nuveen's status as
an underwriter in determining the nature of Nuveen's duty to his
customers to investigate:
192. The paper sold by Nuveen, including WH notes, was rated "Desirable"-the second highest category-by a subsidiary of Standard and Poor. Between September 1968 and
February 1970, when WH defaulted, Nuveen purchased and sold substantially all of WH's
commercial paper.
193. By this time Investors Syndicate of America, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of
Investors Diversified Services, had acquired all of Nuveen's stock. The senior vice-president
of the parent became a Nuveen director and assumed responsibility for the commercial paper
operation.
194. The face amount of the commercial paper outstanding at the time of default was
$1,661,500, represented by 56 notes held by 44 firms or individuals.
195. Investors Diversified Services, Inc. and Investors Syndicate of America, Inc. are
defendants involved as "controlling persons" whose liability under § 20 of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970), occurs only if Nuveen is first held liable.
196. The complaint as amended asserted claims under §§ 12(2) and 17 of the Securities
Act of 1933, §§ 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
197. 524 F.2d at 1069.
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An underwriter's relationship with the issuer gives the underwriter access to
facts that are not equally available to members of the public who must rely
on published information. And the relationship between the underwriter and
its customers implicitly involves a favorable recommendation of the issued
security. Because the public relies on the integrity, independence and expertise of the underwriter, the underwriter's participation significantly enhances
the marketability of the security. And since the underwriter is unquestionably
aware of the nature of the public's reliance . . .the mere fact that he has
underwritten it is an implied representation that he has met the standards of
his profession in his investigation of the issuer. (footnotes omitted),u"

Stevens distinguished the duty of the underwriter from that of the
broker-dealer, stating that unlike the broker-dealer the underwriter
may not rely on published data in recommending a security.'99 He
said the underwriter must go further to satisfy his duty to investigate because he alone has the intimate relationship with the issuer
upon which the investor relies. Stevens stated that the fraud probably would have been discovered if Nuveen had examined WH's
federal tax returns, corporate minute books, or accounting work
papers and held that investigation of these documents was a part
of the underwriter's obligation to investigate.200
No other case has been unearthed by the author that would
require an underwriter of commercial paper to investigate either tax
returns or accounting work papers of the issuer in addition to the
investigation Nuveen conducted. Stevens held that the underwriter
must investigate these documents to have a "reasonable basis for
2 ' This
concluding that the issue is sound.""
requirement of a reasonable basis apparently establishes a negligence standard of culpability under Rule 10b-5 for an underwriter in the Seventh Circuit, 2 2
but the practical consequences of the extent of the investigation
required may be that the underwriter in effect becomes a guarantor.
When this apparent negligence standard of culpability is coupled
198. Id. at 1069-70. Apparently, credit reports on issues of commercial paper were
prepared by Nuveen and given to customers.
Stevens' view is that an underwriter's duty to conduct a reasonable investigation is the
same under the standards of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 10b-5. 524 F.2d at
1070 n.18.
199. Nuveen argued that its duty of disclosure encompasses only "'facts which he
knows and those which are reasonably ascertainable.'" 524 F.2d at 1070.
200. In Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1009 (1972) the WH commercial paper was found to be a "security" within the meaning of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
201. 524 F.2d at 1071.
202. The Seventh Circuit's position on the standard of culpability required in a private
Rule 10b-5 action, although unclear for some time, appears to be headed in the direction of
imposing a negligence standard. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
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with the extent of investigation required, an onerous duty is imposed on underwriters that seems practically and economically unrealistic to execute.
An equally interesting example of Justice Stevens' willingness
to observe the particular transaction as a whole occurs in his dissenting opinion in Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk.21 3 In that case,
Alberto-Culver, an American company that manufactures cosmetics, decided to acquire three foreign business entities 2 4 owned by
Fritz Scherk, a German citizen. Following extensive negotiations in
Europe and the United States, a contract signed in Vienna provided
that Alberto-Culver would receive Scherk's assets, including certain
trademarks, in exchange for cash and promissory notes.2 5 An arbitration clause stated that the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris would arbitrate any controversy arising out of the agreement. 208 Alberto-Culver later discovered that the acquired trademarks were encumbered, and it sued for damages under Rule 10b5,207 alleging that Scherk had made fraudulent representations concerning the trademarks. Scherk sought to stay the action and to
arbitrate as agreed in the contract. Holding for Alberto-Culver, the
district court cited Wilko v. Swan,25 which held that a purchaser
could not waive the protection of the Securities Act of 1933209 by
agreeing to arbitrate disputes. In a 2-1 decision, the Seventh Circuit
210
affirmed, Justice Stevens dissenting.
Relying primarily on The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,'"
Stevens argued for enforcement of the arbitration clause. He reasoned that Congress did not intend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to obstruct acquisitions of foreign businesses and that strong
policies support the settlement of disputes by arbitration in international business disputes. 12 Stevens argued that the main purpose of
203. 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
The American Arbitration Association was granted permission to participate in oral argument, 416 U.S. 954 (1974), and to submit an amicus curiae brief, 415 U.S. 987 (1974). The
Supreme Court reversed on the merits, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), upholding the parties' arbitration

clause.
204. The entities, organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, were engaged in the manufacture of cosmetics and in the licensing of trademarks for their products.
205. The promissory notes were held to be "securities" subject to the Securities Act.

206. The contract further provided that the laws of Illinois would govern the agreement,
its interpretation, and its performance.

207. Alberto-Culver first had tendered back to Scherk the assets acquired, but Scherk
had refused the tender.
208. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
209. See Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
210. 484 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1973).
211. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
212. 484 F.2d at 616.
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the securities acts is to protect unsophisticated investors. Based on
this premise, he distinguished Wilko because the plaintiff there was
unsophisticated. He emphasized that Alberto-Culver and Scherk
were equally sophisticated parties who entered into a negotiated
transaction and that the circumstances justified both an audit or
verification of the property exchanged and the establishment of
means to resolve possible disputes. Stevens further reasoned that
obstacles to waiving the benefits of the 1934 Act should be reduced
to the extent that an investment decision is made independent of
the protection of the Act. Turning finally to the anti-waiver provisions of the securities acts, Stevens found that section 29(a)"' of the
1934 Act did not negate the arbitration clause because enforcement
of the arbitration provision resulted in a waiver only of plaintiff's
right to sue under section 27 of the Act and not of the defendant's
obligation to comply with the 1934 Act. Secondly, Stevens held
section 14214 of the 1933 Act inapplicable because Wilko established,
primarily on policy grounds, that the plaintiff is prohibited from
waiving his right to sue only prior to the time that the dispute arises.
Finding no other statutory barrier, Stevens concluded that the dispute between Alberto-Culver and Scherk over trademark deficiencies was precisely the kind of dispute that should be resolved by
arbitration. Upon hearing Alberto-Culver,215 the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the arbitration provisions, relying on the Arbitration Act of 1925211 and policies similar to those expressed by Stevens.
Justice Stevens' emphasis on the economic and legal consequences of his decisions also can be seen in Eason v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp.2 7 In that Rule 10b-5 action Stevens rejected the
narrow Birnbaum rule1 ' in favor of the following test for standing:
"whether the plaintiffs were members of the class for whose special
benefit Rule 10b-5 was adopted. 2 19 Stevens reasoned that
Birnbaum's purchaser-seller limitation was inconsistent with the
overriding requirement that "'form should be disregarded for sub213. "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970).
214. "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subtitle or of the rules and regulations of
the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
215. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
216. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
217. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
218. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952).
219. 490 F.2d at 658.
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stance and the emphasis should be on economic reality'"220 in
construing the 1934 Act. It might be short-sighted to assume that
the Supreme Court's affirmance of the narrow Birnbaum rule in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores2 2 ' forecloses Stevens' reasoning in Eason. Although the Court in Blue Chip had the opportunity to overrule Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co.,222 it did not do so, and the factual situation in Eason
is somewhat analogous to that in Banker's Life.
Viewed in the aggregate, these cases show that Justice Stevens
will be likely to apply an analysis in securities cases stressing the
policies of the relevant statutes and the economic consequences of
the Court's holding. In Alberto-Culver he stressed the economic
consequences of the decision, observing that "[a]n excessively paternalistic attitude toward American overseas investment will inevitably make American capital less attractive to foreign firms. ' ' 2 2 He
further observed that price or acceptability of the transaction in the
international marketplace may depend on the ability to agree upon
a neutral forum. 224 Similarly, in Eason Stevens extended the protection of Rule 10b-5 to a class of injured plaintiffs who might otherwise
go uncompensated.2 25 In many factual situations Stevens' approach
seems likely to result in an expansion of the perimeter of liability
both with respect to the number of possible plaintiffs and defendants, as in Eason, and with respect to the scope of liability of any
22
one defendant, as in Nuveen. 1
B.

Antitrust

Justice Stevens is known for his experience in the area of antitrust law. His activities prior to his appointment to the Seventh
220.

Id. at 659. Compare Eason with Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) in which Justice Stevens, applying the Howey
test to a discretionary commodities futures trading account with a broker, found a lack of

commonality and thus no investment contract.
221.
222.
223.

421 U.S. 723 (1975); see note 188 supra.
404 U.S. 6 (1971). Stevens relied on this case in Eason.
484 F.2d at 616.

224. Id. at 617.
225. Compare Eason with Milnarik, in which Stevens found that a discretionary commodity futures trading contract with a broker was not an "investment contract" under
Howey, even though similar contracts were held with other customers. See note 220 supra.
226. In Mueller v. Korholz, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922
(1972), Stevens' substance-over-form approach resulted in a finding that the defendantdirector had not realized any profit in a transaction challenged in an action to recover "shortswing" profits under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In Mueller, Stevens

rejected as unrealistic the Second Circuit's harsh appraisal method that attempts to
"'squeeze out all possible profit.' " Id. at 87.
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Circuit have included the following positions: associate counsel to
the House of Representatives subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power; member of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws; lecturer on antitrust law, Northwestern
and University of Chicago Law Schools. 221 While sitting on the
bench, however, Justice Stevens has reviewed few decisions in the
area. This may be attributable to his short term on the bench, as
well as to the Expediting Act of 1903,28 which, prior to amendment
in 1975, provided for direct appeal of government-instituted civil
actions under the Sherman Act to the Supreme Court. Consequently, an attempt to analyze Stevens' judicial posture toward the
control of private economic power would be inappropriate. Some
tentative conclusions, however, can be made as to the manner in
which he decides antitrust cases.
Justice Stevens brings to the Supreme Court a practical approach to the economic issues that form the policy bases for antitrust decisions. In order to accomplish the goal of eliminating unreasonable restraints on trade, courts necessarily must examine the
economic effects of challenged business practices. Stevens displayed
a pragmatic, effect-oriented approach in fashioning relief in
ProtectosealCo. v. Barancik,229 a suit brought under section 8 of the
Clayton Act. 20 In addition to dissolving an interlock2 3 ' of two competing corporations, he enjoined defendant from voting his shares
in elections of the board of directors. Although the statute expressly
prohibits only direct interlocks, the relief granted more effectively
guards against an individual's exerting influence simultaneously
over competing corporations.2 3 2 By prohibiting the creation of an
227. 2 WHO's WHO INAMERICA 2959 (38th ed. 1974).
228. 15 U.S.C. §29 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 29 (Supp. 1, 1975).
229. 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
231. An interlock is created when an individual is simultaneously:
[a] director in any two or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus,
and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in
commerce, . . . if such corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their
business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition
by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any
of the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. §19 (1970).
232. A direct interlock, as proscribed by the statute, involves actual membership on the
boards of directors of two competing corporations. An indirect interlock, which the statute
does not outlaw expressly, occurs when a member of the board of one corporation exercises
his power to hand-pick a director on the competitor's board. The ultimate anticompetitive
effect would be the same for both direct and indirect interlocks. See Kramer, Interlocking
Directorshipsand the Clayton Act after 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266 (1950).

1976]

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

indirect interlock, Stevens implemented the policy, if not the language, of section 8. He took a similarly pragmatic approach in
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc. 3 In that case
Stevens' majority opinion held that a violation of the Patent Office's
conflict of interest rules by a business defendant justified a finding
of an attempt to monopolize because such abuse, if unchecked,
would result in an extension of a protected monopoly.
The assessment of Stevens' approach as pragmatic is buttressed by his heavy reliance on factual considerations. In Avnet,
' 4
the Commission had ordered defendant to divest an
Inc. v. FTC,23
acquired subsidiary. Stevens extensively examined the product
market definition propounded by the FTC.2 3 5 In doing so he displayed an ability to manage large accumulations of data while remaining aware of the economic impact the challenged conduct
would have. His fact-oriented analysis in determining the propriety
of uses of economic power in society may be a continuing characteristic of his judicial career.
Justice Stevens displays a strictly ordered concept of the
federal system. The analysis in Corning Glass Works v. FTC28 suggests his outlook on the division of powers between state and federal
government. In construing the McGuire Act27 as solely a grant of
regulatory autonomy to the states, rather than an indication of federal approval of resale price maintenance, Stevens exhibits reluctance to condone federal encroachment on matters traditionally left
to the states. His perception of the balance between the legislative
and judicial functions is demonstrated in Mullis v. Arco Petroleum
Corp.23 While recognizing considerations that favor prohibiting refiners from terminating their distributors during shortages, Stevens
declined to carry out such a policy by narrowly interpreting the
relevant market in a monopolization action brought by a distributor. He emphasized that the implementation of such a policy was
traditionally a legislative function and that the Sherman Act re233. 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
234. 511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 56 (1975).
235. In reviewing the determination, Stevens included these factual considerations:
defendant's conception of the submarket as separate and distinct; wide price differentiation between the products sought to be included in a wider market definition; lack of
price responsiveness between the products; and functional differences in the manner of
the products' use after sale by the manufacturer.
236. 509 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975).
237. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)-(6) (1970), repealed effective Mar. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94145, 89 Stat. 801.
238. 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974).
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quired the courts to eliminate, not to implement, extra-legislative
regulation.
Stevens seems to utilize a fact-oriented, pragmatic approach in
reaching his decisions, and he appears reluctant to exercise judicial
power in a manner that infringes upon the traditional boundaries
of the federal system. These conclusions seem to be in accord with
analysis of his decision-making in other areas of the law. Although
the cases add little to knowledge of Stevens' posture in antitrust
cases, his experience in the field indicates that he should be an
important figure in future Supreme Court antitrust decisions.
C. Federal Taxation
The several decisions in which Justice Stevens has addressed
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code uniformly evidence a dedication to implementing federal tax policy strictly according to the
expressed intent of Congress. Stevens' reasoning in L. C. Thomsen
& Sons, Inc. v. United States39 presents a prime example. The issue
before the court involved a corporation's treatment of life insurance
proceeds received from a policy it had taken out on the life of its
sole distributor. Relying upon section 101, the taxpayer excluded
the proceeds from its gross income. The Service disallowed the exclusion because the insurance had been purchased to guarantee
collectibility of the distributor's indebtedness to the taxpayer, and
the taxpayer was now writing off the indebtedness as uncollectible. 20 The Service argued that the court should construe the statute
to prevent the taxpayer from receiving the "double benefit" of both
a bad debt deduction and an exclusion of the insurance proceeds.
The court, however, held for the taxpayer. Unpersuaded by the
apparent inequity of the situation, Stevens stated:
Perhaps ... if Congress were squarely faced with the policy question whether
on facts like these some adjustment-possibly a pro tanto inclusion of a portion of the proceeds in gross income-would be appropriate, it might authorize
that result. But on this appeal we may
only decide the issue before us on the
basis of the statute as now written. 2'

Likewise, Stevens' powerful dissent in Economy Finance Corp.
v. United States2M emphasizes his refusal to substitute his judgment
for that of Congress. The issue presented was whether the taxpayer
239. 484 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1973).
240. At the time of his death the distributor owed the taxpayer $48,053.97. The total

death benefit amounted to $50,444.92. Id.
241. Id. at 955.
242. 501 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1974).

1976]

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

corporation was a "life insurance company" for tax purposes. 243
Justice Stevens was convinced that the majority, in denying that
status to the taxpayer, applied a stiffer test than that set forth in
the statute.2 44 Stevens acknowledged that Congress may have been
a bit too liberal in its definition of a "life insurance company" and
that Congress may have acted unwisely in giving preferential tax
treatment to life insurance companies at all. Yet the taxpayer had
more than satisfied the letter of the statute.245 Stevens stressed that
the test Congress had specified-a test clear and unambiguous on
its face-must control.
Only when Congress has not clearly indicated its intent has
Justice Stevens looked beyond the form of the transaction to the
purpose of the statute and the economic reality of the situation.
Kelly v. Commissioner,4 construing the section 213 medical expense deduction, is most enlightening in this respect. The taxpayer
there underwent an emergency operation while away from home on
business. Following his operation, but before he was sufficiently
recovered to return home, the taxpayer was removed from the hospi2 47
tal to a nearby hotel where he continued to receive medical care.
At issue was the deduction for food and lodging expenses incurred
at the hotel. Relying upon its regulations, 2 8 the Service denied the
deduction. The Service argued that the statutory provision had
been significantly amended by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
with the express legislative purpose of excluding deduction "of any
meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical treatment. 12 49 Justice Stevens, however, allowed the deduction. He noted
that the deduction for food and lodging expense incident to medical
treatment did not contravene the language of the statute itself.
Rather, looking to the complete legislative history, Stevens concluded that Congress intended the amended definition of medical
care to prevent vacation costs from being disguised as medical ex243. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 801(a).
244. The majority determined that each company's life insurance reserves were less
than 50% of its total reserves (the test for a "life insurance company" under section 801(a))
because the total reserves should have included a reserve for unearned premiums on health
and accident insurance written by the reinsured parties. Stevens disagreed, reasoning that
inclusion of reserves for unearned premiums is not required by the statute.
245. 501 F.2d at 485.
246. 440 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1971).
247. The taxpayer was requested to vacate the hospital before complete convalescence
because the hospital needed the room. Id. at 307-08.
248. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v) (1968).
249. 440 F.2d at 310. The Commissioner cited H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
30 (1954), and S. REP. No. 1622.
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penses-not to deny relief from the burden of legitimate medical
expenses.25° Citing experience and logic, Stevens held that the Service's contrary regulations must be read in this historical context.2 5'
Moreover, Stevens found in the instant case not the slightest suggestion of abuse of the statutory deduction. The costs incurred placed
a real burden upon the taxpayer and were certainly the type of
medical expense contemplated by Congress.
Indeed, an emphasis on what Congress contemplated is the
common thread of justification running through all of Stevens' tax
decisions. When that intent is clearly indicated in the letter of the
statute, Stevens' attitude is one of strict statutory construction,
regardless of what the "more equitable result" might be. 212 Only
when the statute fails to address a specific issue, or is ambiguous
on its face, has Justice Stevens been willing to entertain policy
considerations.2 53 Even then, Kelly indicates that the only relevant
inquiry is what policy Congress intended to implement. In short,
Justice Stevens is acutely aware of the bounds of appellate review,
and his federal tax decisions, which adhere strictly to the statutory
framework provided by Congress, exhibit his narrow view of those
bounds.
D.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964254 states that it shall
250. 440 F.2d at 308-09. Stevens looked to the Senate hearings before the Committee
on Finance on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Id.
251. 440 F.2d at 311-12. Stevens was subtly rejecting the Commissioner's contention
that "experience, not logic, is the basis of the law; and experience has led to Treasury
Regulation § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v) . . . ." Id. at 308. (emphasis supplied).
252. See Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens found a valid
charitable gift in the difference between the value of property transferred and the fair market
value of a note taken in consideration; moreover, Stevens held the tax benefit rule not
applicable to the receipt of payments on the note-the value of the gift was determined as of
the date of the gift and the subsequent repayment of the face value of the note was contemplated in valuing the note as of that date); Hart Metal Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 437 F.2d
946 (7th Cir. 1971) (Construing adjustments to taxpayer's income in determining "personal
holding company" status under § 543, Stevens rejected taxpayer's argument that tax deficiencies should be deducted in the year assessed; Stevens'read the statute to forbid deduction
of contested tax deficiencies until the dispute is settled and the obligation becomes fixed).
253. See note 244 supra and accompanying text.
254. Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). Section 703 in relevant part
provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . ..
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be unlawful for an employer to discriminate in the hiring or firing
of an individual because of the individual's sex. The Seventh Circuit
decided in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.25 that United's nomarriage rule for female flight cabin attendants discriminated
against the plaintiff because of her sex. In dissent, Justice Stevens
maintained that the discrimination was not directed against female
as opposed to male employees because no male was eligible for the
job of flight cabin attendant. At the time of plaintiff's discharge,
only females could be hired as flight cabin attendants and the nomarriage rule was merely an additional qualification for the job. 26
Plaintiff argued, however, that a prima facie case of sex discimination was established because United permitted its male employees
to marry while requiring its female flight cabin attendants to remain
unmarried. The majority accepted this argument, stressing that in
prohibiting sex discrimination in the hiring and firing of employees,
Congress intended to "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
'257
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens proposed a "but for" test for
deciding whether an individual has been discriminated against because of sex. Rejecting the majority's rationale that any impediment
derived from a stereotyped attitude toward females is sufficient to
establish sex discrimination, Stevens argued that the plaintiff must
show that "but for" her sex she would have been treated differently.
Stevens' dissent in Sprogis indicates that in future Title VII sex
discrimination cases he is likely to scrutinize strictly the question
of differential treatment by applying the objective "but for" test.
Sprogis also reveals Justice Stevens' inclination to interpret the
language of a statute objectively by applying its common sense
meaning and refusing to embellish the statute with his speculation
as to Congress' intent.
E.

Labor Law

Justice Stevens has not written extensively in the area of labor
law, and consequently a full scale analysis of his position in this area
is premature. Nevertheless, one may draw some inferences about his
attitudes in the area from his opinions, many of which are in dissent.
In Moore v. Sunbeam Corp.,2 8 plaintiff was discharged from
255.
256.
257.
258.

444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 1198.
459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972).
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employment after he individually demonstrated against alleged racial discrimination. The collective bargaining agreement under
which plaintiff was employed contained no-strike and arbitration
clauses. Plaintiff charged that the employer committed an unfair
labor practice by interfering with his right to engage in concerted
activity259 and that his union breached its duty of fair representation. 21 Plaintiff appealed from unfavorable decisions by the National Labor Relations Board and the district court. 211 Justice Stevens found that the existence of an unfair labor practice depended
on whether the no-strike clause of the contract prohibited plaintiffs
one-man demonstration, and he deferred to the expertise of the
Board in construing the clause. Stevens also dismissed plaintiff's
claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation
because plaintiff had failed to establish that the union's refusal to
2 2
take his grievances to arbitration was wrongful.
In Louis-Allis v. NLRB,2 63 a majority of the Seventh Circuit
deferred to the judgment of the National Labor Relations Board and
refused to set aside certification of a union, although the union
distributed misleading literature on the eve of the election. Dissenting strongly, Stevens wrote, "I consider the deception sufficiently
gross to justify strong measures. . . .In my opinion, administrative
approval of such fraud does not merit the label 'expertise.' " 264
In NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet,6 5 a majority of the Seventh
Circuit held that a successor employer committed an unfair labor
practice by unilaterally changing working conditions after his obligation to bargain had matured.2 11 Stevens dissented. The
controversy concerned whether the employer had clearly indicated
a plan to retain all of the predecessor's employees by distributing
job applications prior to the turnover date. Although generally an
employer has no duty to bargain over initial terms of employment,
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurity Serv259. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the NLRA].
260. Labor Management Relations Act, Title 1H, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
261. Cases were consolidated for appeal along with dismissal of plaintiff's separate
action in the district court for violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
262. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
263. 463 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1972). For further discussion of this case see notes 331-32
infra and accompanying text.
264. Id. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. 468 F.2d 963 (7th Cir.), vacated, 411 U.S. 912 (1972)(remanding to NLRB for
further consideration in light of recent successor employer decisions). On remand, the Board
held that the employer had unilaterally changed working conditions after the obligation to
bargain arose.
266. See NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
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ice, Inc.2"7 said that a successor employer who clearly plans to retain
all of the employees in a bargaining unit should "consult with" their
bargaining representative before fixing terms. 6 8 Stevens urged that
this exception be construed very narrowly and strongly emphasized
the freedom of the employer in an ordinary purchase transaction to
set initial terms of employment.
In NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products, Inc.,' 9 the Seventh Circuit considered the procedure the NLRB should use to determine
whether to include employees related to management in a bargaining unit. The court held that the Board had not abused its discretion
by excluding family members because of insufficient "community
of interest" with the bargaining unit. In his concurring opinion,
Stevens pointed out that excluding relatives of management because of lack of a "community of interest" may be the de facto
equivalent of excluding them because of potential opposition to a
union. Exclusion on this basis, he said, involves possible conflict
with a recent Supreme Court decision referring to the NLRA as
"wholly neutral" in requiring respect for those who oppose a union
as well as for those who favor one.27 0
The number of Justice Stevens' labor law opinions is not
large.2 1' Since his dissents in labor cases are roughly double the
number of his majority opinions, it might be more appropriate to
comment on what his position is not rather than what it is. The
following statements, therefore, are mere observations, not conclusions. First, while Sunbeam demonstrates that Stevens is generally
willing to defer to the Board in its traditional areas of expertise, his
dissent in Louis-Allis makes clear that he will disregard the Board's
judgment when he thinks the facts require it. Secondly, Bachrodt
and Caravelle when read together suggest a promanagement bias.
In Bachrodt Stevens disagreed with the Board and two colleagues
in his view of the facts and urged a very conservative interpretation
of the Burns exception to the general freedom of an employer to set
initial terms of employment. In Caravelle, Stevens went out of his
way to point out that the NLRA is neutral toward those who oppose
unions. Finally, the dearth of his writing on labor law may indicate
that Justice Stevens has yet to develop a judicial attitude in many
of its areas.
267. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
268. Id. at 294-95.
269. 504 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1974).
270. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278 (1973).
271. See Appendix, Labor Law.
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Attorney Fees

Justice Stevens' opinions 2 dealing with the award of attorney
fees suggest that he concurs with the Supreme Court's approach to
3
this topic in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.1
In that 1975 case, certain environmental groups24 sought attorney
fees incurred in a successful suit to prevent the Secretary of the
Interior from issuing permits for the construction of the transAlaska pipeline. The Supreme Court refused to adopt a "private
attorney general" theory to support the appellate court's award and
reversed on the ground that Congress had not authorized an exception to the general American rule prohibiting such an award.2 5 Refusing to discuss the merits of the American rule, the Court concluded that it is the role of Congress, and not the courts, to change
such a deep-rooted practice."'
Two of Stevens' opinions, one prior to and one after Alyeska
Pipeline, indicate that he concurs in this approach. In the 1973 case
of Associated General Contractors v. Illinois Conference of
Teamsters,27 Stevens rejected the Third Circuit's position2 and
concluded that section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act27 did not

authorize the recovery of expenses in excess of an injunction bond.
In Associated General the union had successfully appealed the issuance of an anti-strike injunction and was seeking to recover costs
272. Seven of Stevens' opinions deal with the topic of attorney fees. These cases are:
Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975); Allen v. W.H. Brady Co., 508 F.2d
64 (7th Cir. 1974); Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring); Associated Gen. Cont. v. Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1973); Protectoseal Co. v.
Barancik, 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973); Strassheim Co. v. Gold Medal Folding Furn. Co., 477
F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1973); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579
(7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
273. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
274. The plaintiffs were the Wilderness Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.,
and Friends of the Earth.
275. 421 U.S. at 259. The Court noted that an award of attorney fees is required under
the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1970); the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a) (1970); and the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970). See generally, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) (attorney fees in
patent litigation); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)(1970).
276. The Court concluded:
But the rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees has survived. It is
deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade
the legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by
respondents and followed by the Court of Appeals.
95 S.Ct. at 1628.
277. 486 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1973).
278. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
923 (1972). Stevens did not comment on the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.
279. 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1970).
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(including attorney fees) in excess of the pre-injunction bond. In
rejecting this claim, Stevens stressed that the statute did not expressly authorize any recovery in excess of the bond amount, noted
that recognition of the claim would depart from well settled practice, and concluded that such a departure requires a specific, unam20
biguous expression of congressional intent.
Stevens' recent opinion in Tryforos v. Icarian Development
Co. 21'supports the conclusion that he accepts both the rationale and
the decision of the Court in Alyeska Pipeline. Tryforos was a shareholder derivative action brought in federal court under diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. The lower court dismissed the action with
prejudice and awarded the defendants attorney fees. 2 2 Stevens reversed the award of attorney fees, relying on dictum in Alyeska
Pipeline8'3 that federal courts must apply state law in awarding
attorney fees in a diversity action. Stevens noted that the cases
defendant relied on to support the power of the federal courts to
award attorney fees were not diversity cases.284 Since he found no
state statute that specifically allowed the award, Stevens disallowed
the grant. Both his general judicial approach in Associated General
and his willing acceptance of dictum in Alyeska Pipeline as an
accurate reflection of the current law support the conclusion that
Stevens considers the Supreme Court's approach correct. Therefore
it appears unlikely, absent specific statutory authorization, that
Stevens would liberalize law governing the award of attorney fees.
Even when an award is authorized by statutes, Stevens has
closely scrutinized it. In Protectoseal Company v. Barancik55 a
company sought the resignation of a director because it feared his
position, involving an indirect interlock, violated section 8 of the
Clayton Act.2 6 The company sought attorney fees, but Stevens interpreted the Act as limiting recovery of fees to cases in which the
plaintiff showed pecuniary injury. Since Protectoseal had failed to
show such injury, Stevens denied the award. Prior case law supports
his conclusion, ' but Stevens did not rely on prior law. Instead he
280. 486 F.2d at 975.
281. 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975).
282. 49 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
283. 95 S.Ct. at 1622-23 n.31.
284. Stevens concluded that the result in Trust Co. v. National Sur. Corp., 177 F.2d
816 (7th Cir. 1949) which likewise refused to authorize attorney fees in a similar fact setting
was not overruled by Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); or Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) since none of these
cases was a diversity case.
285. 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
287. See, e.g., Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Products Co., 374 F.2d 649
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emphasized that the relevant injunctive provision in the Clayton
Act did not specifically authorize the award of attorney fees. '
While it is hazardous to read too much into one opinion, the language in this case is consistent with his attitude in Associated
General.
Finally, three Stevens opinions deal with the award of attorney
fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285211 in patent infringement actions. The
statute allows awards in "exceptional cases," and traditionally the
courts have emphasized that only the unusual case will qualify. ' "
Stevens' opinions indicate that he requires overwhelming facts to
invoke the permissive statutory language. Illustrative of the type of
fact situation that Stevens deems to meet the statutory requirement
is Strassheim Co. v. Gold Medal Folding Furniture.' In that case
the defendant company marketed its product more than one year
prior to the acquisition of the patent 292 and misfiled the documents
that proved the product had been marketed during that time. Because of the misfiling, a trial court erroneously held the patent
valid, and a second trial was necessary. While accepting the trial
court's conclusion that no actual fraud existed in the case, Stevens
held it to be an "exceptional case" under the statute and awarded
attorney fees. Stevens found that the patentee and its attorney demonstrated an exceptional lack of diligence in initially filing the patent without checking on the possibility of unpatentability due to
29 3
prior use for more than one year.
(3d Cir. 1967); Decorative Stone Co., v. Building Trade Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 594 (1928).
288. Stevens noted:
Plaintiff has not proven any pecuniary injury . . . under § 4 of the Clayton Act. That
section authorized the recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee, but there is no such
express authorization in § 16, the section under which this action was brought. We
believe this case should be treated in the customary manner; plaintiff should accept the
normal burden of compensating its own counsel.
484 F.2d at 589.
289. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) reads: "The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."
290. See, e.g., Larchmont Engineering, Inc. v. Toggenburg Ski Center, Inc., 444 F.2d
490 (2d Cir. 1971); Uniflow Mfg. Co. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 428 F.2d 335 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452
F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
291. 477 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1973).
292. A patent will be denied if an invention was described in a printed publication or
offered for sale more than one year prior to the date of the patent application. 35 U.S.C. §
102 (1970).
293. Stevens stated:
This case is truly exceptional because the record unambiguously demonstrates that the
defendant's "exceptional oversight" with respect to "critically important information"
• . . resulted in an erroneous judgment and put plaintiff to legal expenses that would
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The recent case of Allen v. W.H. Brady Co.29 demonstrates
Stevens' willingness to scrutinize closely the facts of a case to determine whether they meet the statutory requirements for an award of
fees. In that case Stevens concluded that a prior patent covered the
subject matter of the patent in dispute and that therefore the patent
was invalid.295 While finding that the patent was invalid, Stevens
found no indication that the patentee had sought to prevent disclosure of relevant facts to the patent office or that any official misconduct occurred in the issuance of the patent. Therefore he concluded
that an award of attorney fees was not justified. Thus the patent
cases indicate that Stevens will stress the restrictive wording of the
statutory authorization in determining whether an award is appropriate.
Stevens' approach to the question of attorney fees is characterized by its restraint. Absent specific and unambigious legislative
authorization, he is unlikely to support an award of attorney fees.
With legislative authorization he is likely to demand strict compliance with the statute. This does not indicate an anti-bar attitude."'
otherwise have been unnecessary.
477 F.2d at 824 n.9. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th
Cir. 1971), is another case in which the fact settings supported an award of attorney fees. In
Giddings, the patentee hired the patent examiner after the award of the initial patent and
had the former examiner actively assist on two patent reissue proceedings. In awarding
attorney fees Stevens stressed the paramount importance of protecting the integrity of, and
the public confidence in, the Patent Office.
294. 508 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1974).
295. The case revolved around the validity of three patents. The patents all dealt with
the development of a device to alert excavating crews of the presence of underground cables.
The first patent described the warning device in general terms. The second patent developed
a specific process to implement this general concept. In an interference proceeding the first
patentee was awarded priority to the specific device. A third patent resulted from work
independent from the second patentee but which produced a nearly identical product. A
patent was issued to the third individual after a different patent examiner concluded that
the first patent did not cover this specific process. The third patentee did not cite, in his
application, the second patent. Id. at 67.
296. For instance in the only two attorney malpractice cases considered by Stevens, he
found for the attorney in each instance. Anastos v. M.J.D.M. Truck Rentals, Inc., 521 F.2d
1301 (7th Cir. 1975); Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973). Although the facts in
each case seemed to mandate the result, Stevens' opinion in Walker evidenced a willingness
to consider solutions favorable to attorneys, in special problems facing the bar. In Walker an
individual brought a malpractice action against his court appointed counsel. In dismissing
the complaint Stevens articulated:
Moreover, there are strong reasons of policy which might persuade the Illinois courts to
hold that a lawyer, who has been appointed to serve without compensation in the defense
of an indigent citizen accused of crime, should be immune from malpractice liability.
Requiring such lawyers to defend charges such as this can only make it more difficult
for the Bar to discharge its professional responsibilities which have recently been so
greatly enlarged by the Supreme Court's holding in Argersingerv. Hamlin.
Id. at 804.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:125

Rather it is in keeping with his overall view of the function of courts.
In this area Stevens is reluctant to move onto untested ground.
Nevertheless, his opinions are logically developed, and if they give
little evidence of dramatic new directions, they at least have the
virtue of consistency.
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In the area of administrative law, the attitude of an individual
judge often has significant impact. Since administrative agencies fit
comfortably into none of the three traditional areas of governmental
power, 9 ' the judiciary often must determine whether an agency's
actions comply with the language of its particular enabling statute
and whether the actions fall within the limits of administrative
discretion.29 8 The difficulty and diversity of these questions frequently result in disagreement within the judiciary itself concerning
its role as the final agency overseer. 9 ' Thus a strong position by
Justice Stevens here might well carry more impact than one in other
areas. Hopefully past decisions written by Stevens will indicate his
attitude toward some issues of administrative law. 09°
A.

Judicial Mandates Concerning Required Agency Procedure
Several Seventh Circuit decisions in which Justice Stevens authored either the majority or dissenting opinions involved the following issues: (1) the amount of agency discretion allowable under
the particular enabling statute involved; (2) the quality of the administrative record that must be presented for review; and (3) the
extent to which informal statements bind an agency in later administrative actions. Stevens' position on these issues will be discussed
in the order stated above.
(1)

Agency Action in Light of Delegated Authority

In Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency,3"' petitioner, a manufacturer of phosphorous paste for home
297. See G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 26 (1974).
298. See Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and
Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972).
299. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07 (1958) (attributing at least
part of the problem to the elusive articulation of the standard of judicial review of agency
decisions).
300. Certainly it would be misleading to suggest that a consideration of any small group
of cases could result in an adequate characterization of a jurist's philosophy in an area.
Nonetheless, evidence of certain attitudes, approaches, and preferences may appear.
301. 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972).
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use as a rat and roach poison, appealed from the Environmental
Protection Agency's cancellation of the registration of the product.
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), the EPA may cancel the registration of poisons if it finds
the labels to be false or misleading. 2° While the agency allegedly
based its decision on a determination that consumers might be
misled by the labels of the product, Justice Stevens' majority opinion concluded that the agency in fact had cancelled the registration
because it believed that the product was simply too dangerous for
home use. The issue thus became whether the statute allowed the
EPA to cancel a registration because it felt the product was "too
dangerous. '3 3 Stevens found that this reason for cancellation exceeded the agency's delegated authority. He therefore set aside the
cancellation order, stating: "After developing and articulating standards consistent with the authority delegated by FIFRA for determining when a label inadequately avoids the danger of harmful
misuse, respondent may again propose cancellation ....
304 Justice Stevens also considered the limitations of the EPA's delegated
authority under FIFRA in Continental Chemiste Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus.0 5 In that case, the EPA cancelled the registration of
appellant's insecticide smoke device under an agency rule that required cancellation when use of a poison in compliance with label
directions would cause exposed food to become "adulterated" under
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) .31' Although use of appellant's product would damage exposed food, the label stated that one
should not use the device near exposed food. With Justice Stevens
writing the opinion, the Seventh Circuit set aside the cancellation
order because the agency's "per se" adulterated approach exceeded
its statutory authority to cancel registrations:"' the administrative
blending of FDCA standards into the FIFRA cancellation proceedings was unauthorized by either statute.0 0
302. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970) authorizes the Administator of the Environmental Protection Agency to cancel the registration of any poison found to be misbranded under the
FIFRA standards.
303. 461 F.2d at 297.
304. Id. at 311. In a subsequent Eighth Circuit decision affirming a registration cancellation on substantial evidence grounds, Stearns was cited only for a basic burden-of-proof
allocation statement. Southern Nat'l Mfg. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 470 F.2d
194, 196 (8th Cir. 1972).
305. 461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972).
306. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 342(a)(2), 346, 346a, 348 (1970).
307. The court suggested that the standards were intended to serve different purposes-FDCA generally applied to new and untested products, while the FIFRA safeguards
were aimed at the adequacy of the labelling. 461 F.2d at 341.
308. Id. at 341-42.
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Justice Stevens also would have refused to permit agency discretion when the limits of the statutory mandate appeared clear in
Hodgson v. Lodge 851, 1AM.0 9 The district court in Hodgson had
dismissed a complaint brought by the Secretary of Labor against a
union because the Secretary had waited longer than the statutory
sixty-day period before filing suit.310 A majority of the Seventh Circuit held that the union had voluntarily waived the statutory bar
and allowed the action to proceed. Justice Stevens in a lengthy
dissent argued that the dismissal should be affirmed."' Emphasizing the express language of the statute and its legislative history,
Stevens rejected the Secretary's argument for greater discretion in
cases of union recalcitrance and unimportant administrative error,
and concluded that the Secretary must act within the time prescribed.
Another FDCA decision written by Justice Stevens indicates,
however, that when an agency applies standards reasonably consistent with statutorily granted authority, he will uphold its ruling
even though a far-reaching economic effect on the parties involved
may result. In United States v. Ewig Brothers Co.,3" ' the FDA had
determined that DDT and dieldrin residues present in smoked
chubs were "food additives" under the FDCA and that the fish
therefore were adulterated and unmarketable under the statute.,'
Stevens' opinion upheld the administrative ruling. Acknowledging
that the tests used might be imprecise, the court nevertheless permitted the agency to use them because they were the best yet devised and because the enforcement guidelines must have contemplated their use.31 '4 Thus, while expressing in Stearns and
Continental Chemiste an intent to scrutinize closely agency actions
in light of the relevant enabling statute, Justice Stevens displayed
in Ewig Brothers a willingness to allow implementation of reasonable although imperfect experimental data as a basis for administrative action under a properly developed standard.
(2)

Quality of the Record Developed for Review

Under section 8(b) of the Federal Administrative Procedure
309. 454 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1972).
310. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).
311. 454 F.2d at 554-65.
312. 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945 (1975). The informal
rulemaking aspects of the case will be discussed at text accompanying notes 321-23 infra.
313. In Justice Stevens' words, "[a] somewhat more disturbing way to state the same
question is whether all of the fish in the Great Lakes are 'adulterated' as a matter of statutory
definition." Id. at 717.
314. Id. at 725.
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Act,"1 5 every adjudicatory decision by a federal agency must be accompanied by a record presenting findings, conclusions, and the
reasons therefor concerning the issues decided. An agency decision
accompanied by an insufficient record is subject to remand on that
ground." 6 In Papercraft Corporation v. FTC, 7' Justice Stevens
chided the FTC for failing to present a record from which the court
could formulate the agency's underlying rationale. The primary
issue was the propriety of an FTC divestiture order issued against
Papercraft under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 31 8 One paragraph of
the order restricted the sale of Papercraft products to specific customers for a three-year period because the agency thought this necessary to assure survival of the divested business.31 1 Stevens found
that the record inadequately demonstrated the need for the provision and deleted it, stating: "Other divestiture orders have included
special provisions designed to insure the survival of the divested
business, but in each such instance the supporting findings demonstrated the need . . . .Such findings are essential .
"..
320
(3)

Binding Effect of Informal Agency Statements

The appropriate role of the judiciary in reviewing informal
agency determinations has prompted much debate.32 ' While no
opinion by Justice Stevens casts much light on his attitude towards
such actions generally, the Ewig Brothers case does discuss the effect that informal agency statements should have upon future actions by the agency itself. Noting that the DDT tolerance limit used
by the government had appeared as an "interim enforcement guideline" in an agency press release, Stevens acknowledged that the
guideline might be viewed as having no binding effect. The opinion
gave the guideline the force of a rule, however, because the language
of the release and the government's treatment of it indicated that
the guideline was meant to function as a generally applicable rule.2 2
While Stevens recognized that agency enforcement based on infor315. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970).
316. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), is probably the
case most often cited for this general proposition. See G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, supra note
297, at 226-29.
317. 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973).
318. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
319. For a fuller explanation of the remedial order's substance, see 472 F.2d at 931 &
nn.10 & 11.
320. Id. at 931-32.
321. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 298; Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking,
60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
322. 502 F.2d 715, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945 (1975).
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mal rules was not uniformly approved,3 2 he stated that the guideline should bind the agency just as a formal rule promulgated in full
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act would. Whether
this language implies that Justice Stevens generally views the informal rulemaking procedure as an acceptable practice is conjectural.
Justice Stevens, however, did refrain from criticizing the practice
when given the opportunity.
B.

JudicialAcknowledgment of Legislative Prerogative

In many instances the issue on appeal of an administrative
decision is the extent of the agency's latitude to make substantive
determinations rather than the limits of its power under an interpretation of its enabling statute. Such cases give rise to a separate,
more flexible species of judicial review. Seventh Circuit cases of this
type in which Justice Stevens has figured appear in the following
areas: (1) the proper deference to be given administrative expertise;
(2) the kind of agency infraction that may be excused as "harmless
error"; and (3) the proper interpretation of the "substantial evidence" standard of review.
(1)

Deference to Administrative Expertise

In the Papercraftcase, a Stevens majority opinion rejected an
administrative expertise argument.32 4 After examining the novel
remedial order proposed by the FTC, the opinion distinguished
cases in which agency familiarity with the effects of a violation
justified deference to the administrative sanction imposed, and
stated: "[W]hen . . . [the agency] selects an untried and blunt
instrument which will certainly cause some impairment of statutory
objectives, we require a more careful exposition of its justification
before we will sanction it as a proper remedial tool. 3 25 The
Papercraftopinion properly exhibited concern that the administrative remedy advanced could cause exactly the type of problem that
the antitrust statutes were intended to prevent, but interestingly
the court flatly invalidated the special FTC order rather than remanding the case for a fuller explanation of the agency's justification.
Another Stevens opinion provides a different perspective on
323. Id. at 725 n.34.
324. The following cases utilizing an FTC expertise rationale were cited by the court:
FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419
(1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). 472 F.2d at 933 n.17.
325. 472 F.2d at 933.
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judicial deference to agency expertise. In United States ex rel.
Miller v. Twomey," 6 the court considered six separate charges that
officials of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections had violated
prisoners' constitutional rights to due process in prison disciplinary
proceedings. At the district court level, four of the charges had been
dismissed. Reviewing the principles presented in Morrissey v.
Brewer," ' Justice Stevens remanded five cases for the fashioning of
appropriate relief and affirmed the dismissal of one complaint. Stevens emphasized, however, that prison personnel need a wide range
of discretion and remarked: "This does not mean, however, that
every decision by prison officials should be subject to judicial review. . . . [I]t is abundantly clear that a myriad of problems of
prison administration must remain beyond the scope of proper judicial concern. ' ' 31 The Stevens majority in Twomey 2 9 appears to permit more administrative discretion in the corrections area than it
might tolerate had a statutorily created federal agency been chal33
lenged. 1
Justice Stevens' dissent in Louis-Allis Co. v. NLRB 31 demonstrates his hesitancy to affirm agency actions solely on the ground
of administrative expertise. In that case the employer claimed that
an NLRB election certification was invalid because the union improperly had procured votes through misleading propaganda and
that the Regional Director had abused his discretion by overruling
the employer's objections without an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit majority found that the employer's objection required
326. 479 F.2d 701 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). For a discussion of this case
in the context of due process rights of prisoners see notes 160-69 supra and accompanying
text.
327. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
328. 479 F.2d at 713. The details of the Twomey due process claims are not necessary
to a discussion of the administrative expertise aspects of the decision.
329. In fact, the Twomey majority appeared to choose a middle course concerning the
specific charges before it. While finding that there had been a violation of due process rights,
the court was unwilling to fashion the remedies it believed necessary. Writing in dissent,
Judge Swygert argued that the Stevens majority was much too hesitant in returning the case
for further proceedings and likely would accomplish little else but another appeal to the
Seventh Circuit. Id. at 723-24.
330. In Encyclopaedia Britannica v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975), Justice Stevens
sitting alone denied an eleventh hour request for an injunction against the FTC on Freedom
of Information Act grounds. Admitting some uncertainty concerning the merits of the movant's claim, he denied the motion, stating:
In sum, I am persuaded that the presumption that the Commission will deal fairly with
the litigants before it heavily outweighs the likelihood of irreparable injury which may
result from denial of the pending motion.
Id. at 1015.
331. 463 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of this case in the context of labor
law see notes 263-64 supra and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 29:125

no hearing because it raised no substantial issue of fact. Indicating
his belief that the employer had exposed union deception, Stevens
dissented, stating that administrative approval of union fraud did
not merit the label expertise.332 Thus aside from the Twomey deci-

sion in the corrections area, Stevens' opinions reveal a reluctance to
defer to administrative expertise in a close case absent a showing
that the agency action fully is justified on the record.
(2) Harmless Error at Preliminary Stages
If the full range of available administrative procedure provides
adequate protection to the individual, courts often will find minor
procedural shortcomings in a preliminary stage to be harmless
error. 333 Justice Stevens' opinion in Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric
Power Co. 3 4 includes a discussion of this administrative harmless

error doctrine. In Lucas, a class of consumers challenged the regulations under which the electric company could terminate customer
service. A company official made the initial termination decision
after reviewing overdue bills. He then sent a notice of impending
termination to the customer. Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to a full hearing, including reference of the contested billing to
an impartial arbiter, prior to the severance of service.33
Stevens considered the pretermination hearing issue in the context of the full procedure available to the customer. Since the state
usually had to adjudicate the amount due from the terminated customer, an eventual full judicial hearing was assured. Concerning the
propriety of the company's initial decision-making process, Stevens
stated that a less strict standard of review applied to tentative
agency decisions, even if they have an immediate and significant
effect on a litigant's use or ownership rights. The court found that
the company had met the requirements of procedural due process
because the initial termination entailed a determination that a
reasonable possibility existed of obtaining a judgment against the
delinquent customer.

3

Finding that the power company's self-

332. Id. at 520. The Seventh Circuit subsequently cited Louis-Allis in NLRB v. Visual
Educom, Inc., 486 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1973), another decision upholding an ex parte
investigation of the NLRB Regional Director on an administrative expertise argument.
333. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness:A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969);
Jaffe, The JudicialEnforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HARV. L. REV. 865 (1963).
334. 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). Wisconsin Electric
most often is cited for its primary holding that public utility customer service terminations
are not equivalent to "state action." See Limuel v. Southern Union Gas Co., 378 F. Supp.
964 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
335. 466 F.2d at 651-52.
336. Id. at 650.
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interest in maintaining customer goodwill probably would protect
individuals from the threat of frivolous terminations, Justice Stevens ruled that "[t]he possibility of an occasional error at a preliminary stage of a procedure which is routinely fair does not invalidate
'337
the entire procedure.
(3)

Administrative Orders under the Substantial Evidence Rule

3 38 the plaintiff
In Stark v. Weinberger,
had appealed an agency
denial of a request for social security disability benefits. The trial
court affirmed the administrative denial on the ground that substantial support for it existed in the record.3 ' Closely examining the
record presented for review, Justice Stevens' majority opinion acknowledged the narrow scope of review; nonetheless, the decision
asserted that the court need not accept blindly the agency findings,
but could review all the evidence in the record.3 4 1 Stevens was impressed by the amount of uncontroverted medical testimony introduced at the initial hearing in support of plaintiff's claim, and he
ruled that the agency had failed to provide substantial evidence
supporting the denial of benefits. Noting that a remand would be
costly for both parties, that it entailed another potential series of
federal court appeals, and that the amount in controversy was relatively small, the Stevens opinion, with Judge Pell vigorously dissenting, 31 reversed and ordered plaintiffs claim paid.342

C.

Conclusion

The few administrative law opinions by Justice Stevens demonstrate his familiarity with the structure and purpose of administrative schemes and show his willingness to delve into statutory background and to analyze legislative intent when it is asserted that an
agency has abused its discretion. Justice Stevens does not view a
court as a rubber stamp for agency determinations, but carefully
337. Id. at 652.
338. 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974).
339. The substantial evidence standard appears in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) and received exhaustive explication in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-87
(1951).
340. In support of this view, Justice Stevens cited Byrd v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp.
957, 959 (D.S.C. 1973). 497 F.2d at 1099 n.14.
341. Judge Pell in dissent vigorously argued that a proper interpretation of the substantial evidence doctrine required affirmance. He found that the Stevens' majority had engaged
in independent fact-finding instead of detached review of the record, and that even under
the majority's interpretation of the agency's evidence as unconvincing, the court should have
remanded for further proceedings instead of simply overturning the result on the basis of the
written record. 497 F.2d at 1102-03.
342. Id. at 1101.
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scrutinizes actions in light of the relevant statute and basic principles of administrative law. In the Stearns and ContinentalChemiste
cases, he found that the agency overstepped its statutory mandate.
In Ewig Brothers he allowed the agency to apply an informal rule,
but cautioned that the rule, though informal, would limit future
agency action unless a change in policy was similarly publicized.
The Papercraft decision chided the FTC for failure to preserve an
adequate record of administrative proceedings, while in Hodgson
Stevens' dissent condemned the use of an administrative expertise
justification when the action involved noncompliance with a statutory mandate. At a minimum these cases indicate that Justice Stevens does not favor a "hands-off' judicial attitude when agency
action is challenged.
Although he recognized the need for some deference to administrative expertise and the existence of the harmless error doctrine in
Twomey and Wisconsin Electric, Stevens carefully limited the holdings to the specific facts involved. No widespread endorsement of
agency discretion appears in either opinion. Further, the brief
Louis-Allen dissent suggests that Justice Stevens is acutely aware
of the judicial tendency to accept an administrative expertise justification to prevent scrutiny of possible agency abuses of discretion.
The Stark opinion arguably presents an expansive view of the
reviewer's role. Although the decision acknowledged that the scope
of review must be narrow, the court in effect re-examined the plaintiff's evidence and found it to outweigh that asserted as the basis
for the agency's decision.
Justice Stevens may develop a reputation as an activist concerning administrative review during his tenure on the Supreme
Court. He is capable of painstaking statutory analysis and wary of
potential abuse of discretion by agencies. Justice Stevens has been
quick to invalidate administrative decisions not justified by the
record presented, and on occasion may appear to "re-try" the case
on the basis of the written evidence in the record. Justice Stevens'
viewpoints may form the crucial wedge in future Supreme Court
cases in the administrative law field.
VI.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

When faced with a question of federal jurisdiction, Justice Stevens tends to find jurisdiction whenever it arguably exists. Principles of comity and federalism temper his broad view of federal judicial power, but Justice Stevens clearly favors the existence and
retention of jurisdiction when these notions do not conflict with its
exercise.
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Justice Stevens demonstrated a willingness to avoid the statutory proscription of a federal injunction against state proceedings in
Barancik v. Investors FundingCorp.43 That case raised the question
whether a federal action to enjoin state court suits filed before any
state proceeding was pending must be dismissed under the federal
anti-injunction statute when a state suit subsequently is filed before
a decision in the federal action. The anti-injunction statute provides
that no federal court may enjoin a pending state proceeding except
(1) when the injunction is expressly authorized by act of Congress,
(2) when it is needed to protect or effectuate a judgment, or
(3) when necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction.3 4 4 The
Supreme Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers345 held that these three exceptions are the
only exceptions to the statute's general prohibition. Justice Stevens
could have dismissed the action by strictly applying the statute with
its three enumerated exceptions. He declined to do that. Instead, he
said that "the applicability of the statute may be avoided by the
3 4 By
timing of defendants' resort to the state forum.""
determining
the question as of the time the federal court's power was invoked,
not at some later time, Justice Stevens determined that the antiinjunction statute did not apply. The injunctive action had been
brought to preserve the status quo while the court considered the
controverted jurisdictional issues of the case, a reason not clearly
within the enumerated exceptions to the anti-injunction statute.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens found that reason, together with the
timing factor, sufficient to avoid the statutory proscription.3 47
In reaching the result of this case, Justice Stevens evinced a
reluctance to permit the ouster of federal jurisdiction to enjoin a
state action by the subsequent filing of a state proceeding, even if
the injunction is not literally in aid of the court's jurisdiction. Thus,
Justice Stevens professed to adhere to the strict reading of the anti3 8
injunction statute mandated by Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,
while declining to apply the statute in a situation that does not
clearly meet one of the three enumerated exceptions to its applicability. Justice Stevens alluded to a perceived congressional purpose
to "avoid subordinating the exercise of federal judicial power to the
will of one of the litigants. ' 349 This jealous guarding of the power of
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

489 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1973).
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
398 U.S. 281 (1970).
489 F.2d at 936.
Id. at 937.
398 U.S. 281 (1970).
489 F.2d at 938.
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federal courts, tempered by considerations of comity,35 is a continuing theme in Justice Stevens' decisions on jurisdictional issues.

In Carson v. Allied News Co.," ' Justice Stevens indicated a
willingness in the appropriate case to depart from established authority and recognize in a federal appellate court the power under
28 U.S.C. § 1653 to strike nondiverse parties in order to preserve
diversity jurisdiction in the action.352 Stevens' discussion of this
topic was dictum in the instant decision because the case did not
present the issue in a context appropriate for its determination.
Nevertheless, the dictum clearly shows that Justice Stevens prefers
to retain jurisdiction when it arguably exists. Here the jurisdiction
in question was that of an appellate court, but the effect of
recognizing that court's power to dismiss nondiverse parties is to
limit challenges to federal diversity jurisdiction in general.
Justice Stevens considered a political question attack on federal jurisdiction in Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v.
Lewis.3

3 In

1

that case plaintiffs354 brought a first amendment claim,

alleging that they had been discharged from state positions because
they refused to change their political affiliation or support partisan
political activities. Defendant, the Secretary of State of Illinois,
contended that the controversy was "political" and therefore nonjusticiable.3 5 5 Building on the rationale of Baker v. Carr,31, Justice

Stevens determined that the issue was justiciable and held that an
employee's discharge from employment because of political allegiance violates the first amendment right of free association. Justice
Stevens reasoned that when a discharge is motivated by considera350. Justice Stevens suggested in his opinion that this case might be one in which the
district court in its discretion should decline to enjoin the state action by considering principles of equity, comity, and federalism, apart from the anti-injunction statute. That issue was
not before the Seventh Circuit, however. 489 F.2d at 938.
351. 511 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1975).
352. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1970) provides in part: "Defective allegations upon jurisdiction
may be amended, upon terms, in the appellate courts." The question to be considered in the
"appropriate case" is whether an amendment striking a nondiverse party is an amendment
of a jurisdictional allegation within the meaning of § 1653. See 511 F.2d at 24 n.4.
353. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
354. Plaintiffs held non-civil service positions as building employees, clerical workers
and license examiners.
355. Defendant further contended that federal judges may not impose a civil service
system on the State of Illinois and that a tradition of uninterrupted acceptance of the "patronage system" may not be overcome by judicial fiat.
356. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker v. Carrthe Supreme Court identified several factors
indicative of a nonjusticiable political question including: whether the question had been
decided or would be decided by a branch of government coequal with the Supreme Court;
the risk of embarrassment to the government abroad or of grave disturbance at home; and
the absence of judicially manageable standards. 369 U.S. at 226.
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tions of race, religion, or constitutionally protected conduct, the
state's action is subject to federal judicial review under the fourteenth amendment. Although he noted that state interests may justify curtailing the political activities of some public employees, Stevens concluded, "[n]o state interest could justify a requirement
that an employee falsely swear allegiance to an offensive religious
or political faith, or a requirement that he actively work for, or speak
out in favor of, a political cause he deemed obnoxious. The basic
'35 7
rights of citizenship survive acceptance of public employment.
Justice Stevens' position has been rejected by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which refused to consider the constitutionality of a discharge for political reasons.3 11 Justice Stevens likewise could have avoided this difficult case by finding it nonjusticiable. Instead he considered the merits of plaintiffs
contentions in determining the jurisdictional question, since only by
so doing could the political question issue be resolved. This demonstrates a noteworthy willingness to take hard cases and a reluctance
to use the federal courts' limited jurisdiction as a shield.
A case not directly related to federal jurisdiction, but nevertheless indicative of Justice Stevens' flexible approach to procedural
matters, is Jimenez v. Weinberger," which deals with the timing
of the certification of a plaintiff class. In that case defendant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare appealed from a district
court order directing him to pay benefits to individuals who were
certified as members of a plaintiff class after a decision and appeal
on the merits of the underlying claim." The Secretary contended
that the district court was without power to certify the class after a
decision on the merits. Rejecting defendant's position, Justice Stevens held that delay in certification does not conclusively deprive
the district court of the power to certify the class even though Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires certification "as soon as
practicable." While recognizing that the class ordinarily must be
promptly certified, Stevens explained that Rule 23 contemplates
flexibility in its enforcement and therefore authorizes later certifica357.
358.
v. Shapp,
359.
360.

473 F.2d 561, 572 (7th Cir. 1972).
Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971); American Fed. of State Employees
443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975).
The original plaintiffs, illegitimate children born after onset of their father's disa-

bility, sought both individual and class relief for insurance benefits denied illegitimates under
the Social Security Act. A three-judge court upheld the challenged provision without consid-

ering the class action issue. Jiminez v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 1356 (N.D. Ill.
1973). On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court, in Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974),
reversed and remanded without reference to the class action issue. The district court subsequently granted relief to plaintiffs and other similarly situated applicants.
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tion when the situation warrants it.
Under the facts in the instant case, Justice Stevens reasoned
that greater harm would result from permitting the government to
avoid its obligation to pay disability benefits because of a procedural error committed by the district court than from allowing individuals to become parties to the judgment long after their positions
as plaintiffs should have been established. Stevens further concluded that notwithstanding the district court's failure to certify the
class, the court acquired jurisdiction of the class action when the
complaint was filed and that therefore the claims of the class were
not barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, the unusual event of
class certification after a decision and appeal on the merits was
upheld by Justice Stevens. Again, this is evidence of a hesitancy to
limit a federal court's jurisdiction to decide the issues before it.
The final case to be considered in this section is United States
3 61 That case raised the issue of the "affecting comv. Staszcuk.
merce" jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. 62 Justice Stevens found jurisdiction even though no acts actually affecting commerce had occurred because, had the plan of defendant been carried
out, commerce would have been affected. By upholding criminal
jursidiction whenever a realistic probability exists that the consummated extortion or robbery would have affected interstate commerce, Justice Stevens' decision extends the power of the federal
courts to the hearing of cases involving the traditionally local crimes
of extortion and robbery. Arguably, this exceeds the scope of jurisdiction Congress intended to confer in the Act.363 The case thus
serves as another example of Justice Stevens' broad interpretation
of federal jurisdiction, an interpretation that in some cases apparently conflicts with statutes and precedent.
As the above cases suggest, Justice Stevens appears to favor
recognizing federal jurisdiction in close cases and retaining jurisdiction once it is invoked. The tendency may be tempered by notions
of comity and federalism, but not so tempered as to prevent a departure from traditional views. If Justice Stevens continues this approach while sitting on the Supreme Court, where more discretion
to take or refuse cases exists, he may provide a new voice in favor
of hearing hard cases and opposed to excessive use of the jurisdictional shield.
361. 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 65 (1975), commented on in 28 VAND.
L. REV. 1348 (1975).
362. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
363. See 28 VAND. L. REV. 1348, 1360 (1975).
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VII.

CONCLUSION

This section is perhaps erroneously captioned, for Justice
Stevens is beginning, not ending, his most influential years on the
bench. Nevertheless, one who peruses the Seventh Circuit opinions
of the Justice does find in them consistencies and continuing
themes.
In the area of constitutional law, Justice Stevens gives short
shrift to private interests he considers of small magnitude, such as
the interest of a high school student in wearing his hair long " or the
interest of a couple in the husband's presence at childbirth."' When
rights he considers basic are at issue, however, he tends to scrutinize
36
government action more closely. For example, in Vann v. Scott,
he carefully considered the state's duty to give juvenile delinquents
proper rehabilitative care, and in Cousins v. City Council of
Chicago3 ' he would have struck down a gerrymandering scheme
based on the political persuasion of the voters. He looks particularly
closely at the procedure followed by the government in depriving a
citizen of liberty or property,36 but when proper procedure has been
followed and the state has an arguably legitimate interest in its
action, he tends to uphold the state's action.3 6 While he is a conservative judge in the sense that he gives the states latitude to develop
their own solutions to problems on the boundaries of constitutional
law, Justice Stevens is not afraid to strike out boldly to preserve
from state encroachment what he considers an important right. For
370
example, in Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewi
he refused to label a firing for partisan political reasons a political
question. Rejecting this jurisdictional escape route (chosen by the
Second Circuit in a similar case), 31 he forthrightly considered the
problem and found that such activity violated the first amendment.
How does Justice Stevens define a constitutional right? For
him, individual rights exist within the context of competing state
interests and policies. He looks closely at the interest the individual
asserts and then balances it against the state's interest. Thus in the
Lisk case, 72 he looked at an illegal search and seizure in two steps
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
en banc,
369.
370.
371.
372.

Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972).
466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
See, e.g., Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 (1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), rev'd
494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
See Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972).
473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971).
United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975).
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and found that the defendant had no standing to contest the search
because his interest in privacy was not invaded and that the seizure
itself was reasonable. His emphasis on defining the particular individual interest asserted is particularly evident in the due process
area, where he looks meticulously for an interest in property or
liberty that has been invaded before addressing the question of lack

of due process.37 3 One consequence of this approach is a narrow

definition of those interests of constitutional dimension." In all,
Justice Stevens acts with restraint in considering questions of contitutional scope and gives the states latitude to try varying solutions
to such questions. This restraint appears to stem primarily from a
conservative view of the judiciary's proper role in our government
and may not reflect the Justice's own thoughts on what the "good"
or "right" answer would be to any particular dispute between the
state and an individual.
In the hodgepodge of areas discussed under the federal statutory law heading, the Justice's methodology at least can be discerned. He looks first to the statute in question; 37 if he feels the
statutory language clearly answers the issue raised, he ends his inquiry there; when he finds room for interpretation, he looks both at
the legislative policy behind the act and at the economic effect he
considers desirable before he reaches a resolution. 31 While the Justice is known for his expertise in antitrust law, the cases he has
decided provided little opportunity for him to display it. In the
securities area, his finding of liability in the Nuveen case 37 and
standing in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.378 suggests
a readiness to come to the aid of the investor and to extend liability
under Rule 10b-5 even beyond its present bounds. The Justice's
labor law opinions give little insight into his views in that area,
though the reader may wish to consider the preponderance of his
37
votes in favor of management.

The remaining areas discussed, administrative law and federal
jurisdiction, are areas in which Justice Stevens has struck a generally expansive posture. In administrative law, he is an activist. He
looks to the statutory basis for agency action, and if he finds it
373.
F.2d 1025
374.
375.
376.
rev'd, 417
377.
378.
379.

See, e.g., Shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g on rehearing, 447
(7th Cir. 1971).
See, e.g., notes 2-30 and accompanying text.
L. C. Thomsen & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 484 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1973).
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
U.S. 506 (1974).
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975).
490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
See notes 258-71 supra and accompanying text.
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wanting, he is not reluctant to strike down the action.38 He acknowledges that in some areas an agency may have expertise he lacks," '
but in general he appears ready to rethink agency actions himself,
and to overrule them if he thinks them incorrect and he has an
arguable basis for reversal. He takes a similarly activist position
toward federal jurisdictional problems. While he often considers it
improper to give a federal directive to state officials, he jealously
guards the power to decide whether to issue such a directive. Thus
in Barancik8 2 he narrowly construed a statute limiting the court's
injunctive power, and in the Lewis case3 he refused to use a "politi-

cal question" rationale to avoid a difficult first amendment problem.
In sum, Justice Stevens construes the power of the federal judiciary broadly. In constitutional areas, he generally wields this power
with restraint and tends to defer to reasonable determinations by
state officials and courts. In areas of statutory law, he looks first to
the statute itself and then if necessary to the underlying policies. He
seems always to have one eye on the practical and economic effects
his construction of a statute will have. In every area, it is difficult
to sum up his approach, for he tends to follow a case-by-case analysis, exhaustively considering the factual background of the case, its
procedural posture, and the varying policies and authorities involved. In individual opinions, however, his clear reasoning and
structural soundness enable the reader to discern readily his holding
and his views. We hope this project has given the reader insight into
380. Steams Elec. Paste Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 461 F.2d 293 (7th
Cir. 1972).
381. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973).
382. Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp., 489 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1973).
383. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
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Justice Stevens' first years on the bench. We look forward to the
further articulation of his judicial positions that the years and opinions ahead should bring.
KENNETH HARMON
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APPENDIX*
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

Due Process

Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring) (state
official who could be removed at the governor's discretion had no property interest
in his position entitling him to a due process hearing upon discharge; due process
hearing would involve an excessive invasion of state policy-making by the federal
judiciary).
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975) (post-indictment hearing provided
by state judicial machinery is sufficient to satisfy demands of due process regarding taking of prisoner's property by prison guards).
Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975) (the due process clause of the fifth
amendment prohibits the federal government from making irrational and discriminatory choices regarding the distribution of property by intestate succession).
Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974) (due process
clause did not protect teacher against arbitrary and capricious discharge because
no interest in liberty or property was impaired).
Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1971) (judicial power of summary punishment for direct contempt is constitutionally exercisable by the legislative branch)
(Stevens, J., dissenting: state legislature cannot convict and sentence individual
for contempt without prior notice or opportunity to be heard).
Horvath v. City of Chicago, 510 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1975) (claim by massage parlor
operators that nuisance ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and did not give
fair notice that such conduct was proscribed failed to provide a proper basis for
federal interference with state civil litigation that would presumably eliminate
ambiguity).
Illinois State Employees Union Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972)
(the fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from discharging a non-policymaking state employee because he refused to transfer his political allegiance
from one party to another).
Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(prisoner's allegation that ring taken by prison officials was not returned upon
his release stated a claim for relief under 1871 Civil Rights Act as well as a claim
for tortious conversion under Illinois law; post-deprivation remedy provided by
state against the culpable agents satisfied procedural due process).
McTaggart v. Secretary of the Air Force, 458 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1972) (requirement
that public employee show cause at pretermination hearing why he should not be
dismissed does not violate due process).
Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974) (school board's decision
to terminate teacher's employment allegedly based on his mode of appearance did
not violate due process).
* The appendix does not list all of Justice Stevens' opinions while sitting on the Seventh Circuit. Only those the compilers considered of potential interest to practitioners and
scholars are included.
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Shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g on rehearing,447 F.2d 1025 (7th
Cir. 1971) (state requirement of notice of termination did not give nontenured
teacher a property interest in her position, nor was the stigma imposed on
teacher sufficient to impair her interest in liberty).
Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 486 F.2d 691
(7th Cir. 1973) (teacher whose contract was not renewed at end of her probationary period was entitled to a statement of reasons and pretermination hearing) (Stevens, J., dissenting: federal courts lack the competence necessary to
make the kind of policy judgment that this case implicitly authorizes).

B.

Equal Protection

Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (racial and political gerrymandering according to political persuasion presents justiciable issue and should be judged by same
standard as gerrymandering according to race).
Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal government may not discriminate against illegitimate Indian child in distributing intestate property left by
collateral heir).
Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972) (record contained no basis for
conclusion that there was systematic exclusion of young adults from jury service).

C.

State Action

Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., No. 74-1930 (7th Cir., October 28, 1975) (private university's discriminatory hiring practices regarding females not actionable under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985(3) (1970) because no state action existed).
Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (discrimination by corporate
landlord against lawyers engaged in criminal practice did not operate to deprive
plaintiff of equal protection of laws under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) because no
state action existed).
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1114 (1973) (power company's discontinuance of service without prior hearing did not violate procedural due process because no state action existed).

D. Right to Jury Trial
Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub. noma., Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189 (1974) (litigant in action brought pursuant to Title VIII of Civil
Rights Act has right to trial by jury).

E.

First Amendment Rights

Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972) (high school hair regulation ruled
unconstitutional though it was approved by a majority of students and permitted exemption by parental consent) (Stevens, J., dissenting: no constitutional
right impaired).
Buford v. Southeast Dubois County School Corp., 472 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1973)
(school board's transfer of Protestant students to a formerly Catholic school in
a predominantly Catholic area does not violate the establishment clause of the
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first amendment, provided that certain changes are made to relieve the school
of its parochial atmosphere).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(defamatory statement dealing with a matter of significant public interest protected by the first amendment in the absence of evidence that publisher had
knowledge of its falsity or acted with reckless disregard of its truth).
Hanover Twp. Fed. of Teachers, Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp.,
457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972) (economic activities of a union or other association
are not protected by the first amendment and may be prohibited or protected as
a matter of legislative policy).
Herzbrun v. Milwaukee County, 504 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1974) (disruptive conduct
of state employees was not symbolic speech or protected expression, and the
rule under which they were discharged was not unconstitutionally overbroad)
(Stevens, J., concurring: plaintiffs did not have standing to invoke first amendment since their conduct was not even arguably communicative).
Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) (state may not infringe prisoner's
right of communication unless the restriction is related both reasonably and
necessarily to the advancement of a justifiable purpose of imprisonment) (Stevens, J., concurring: state did not meet its burden of justifying ad hoc determination because it did not consider less drastic alternatives).
Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd en banc, 494 F.2d 85 (7th
Cir. 1974) (prison mail censorship bearing rational relationship to or reasonably
necessary for advancement of justifiable state purpose is constitutional) (Stevens, J., dissenting: state ad hoc action placing a prior restraint on a prisoner's
freedom of expression requires the closest judicial scrutiny).

F. Right of Privacy
Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem. Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975) (the right of marital
privacy does not include the right of spouse to have husband present in the delivery room of a public hospital that has, for medical reasons, adopted a rule requiring his exclusion).

G.

ConstitutionalRights of Juveniles

Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (a high
school dress code that a committee of students, teachers and administrators had
formulated and a majority of the students regulated had adopted did not violate
a student's constitutional rights to regulate the length and style of his hair when
the code allowed a student's parents to give written consent for the child's noncompliance).
United States ex rel. Bombacino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974) (a juvenile court judge is not required either to provide an evidentiary hearing or to give
a statement of reasons in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile from his court
to a court of ordinary jurisdiction).
Coughlin v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 472 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1973) (the potential
difference between maximum length of sentence for a juvenile offender and
that for an adult convicted of the same offense is not a violation of the equal
protection clause).
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Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972) (a statute that classifies runaway youths
as delinquents in the same way as juvenile felons does not violate the equal protection clause; punishment of runaways in the same way as juvenile felons, however, may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment).

I.

CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

FourthAmendment Protections

Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975) (prisoner entitled to prove
that an alleged taking of property in random shakedowns was unreasonable search
and seizure).
Dichiarinte v. United States, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(would defer to district court judge's holding that the police had not exceeded
bounds of consent search).
United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975) (declined to decide whether
warrantless arrest violates fourth amendment).
Kahn v. United States, 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (telephone conversations between husband and wife with
respect to ongoing violations of state gambling laws admissible under Title I of
the Omnibus Crime Control Act.).
Lee v. United States, 448 F.2d 604 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971) (technical error in search warrant description does not void warrant).
United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant, whose conviction
for possession of a firearm was based on evidence resulting from an unlawful
search and seizure, had standing to contest the seizure but not the search).
Ramsey v. United States, 503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932
(1975) (Title ImI of Omnibus Crime Control Act not unconstitutional on its face).
United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974) (warrantless search not justified by police officer's belief that defendant was about to destroy evidence).

B.

Fifth Amendment Confessions

Mates v. United States, 444 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (admission of statement obtained in violation of defendant's fifth amendment right
deemed harmless error).
Oliver v. United States, 505 F.2d 301 (1974) (defendant entitled to Miranda warnings in noncustodial interrogation by Internal Revenue agents).
Springer v. United States, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (interrogation of defendant without notice to counsel
violates procedural due process).

C. Right to Counsel
Ganz v. Bensinger, 480 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1973) (no constitutional right to counsel at
at a parole release hearing).
Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1971) (defendant received effective assistance of counsel although counsel informed the
appellate court that he could find no merit in appeal).
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Jeffers v. United States, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant adequately
represented although counsel alleged a conflict of interest and attempted to withdraw).
Wimberley v. Laird, 472 F.2d 923 (7th Cir. 1973) (failure of trial counsel to raise a
defense was a trial tactic and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1972) (petitioner's right to appeal not foreclosed by appointed counsel's failure to file a timely motion for new trial).
Wright v. Ingold, 445 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1971) (no constitutional right to have counsel
at a draft board hearing).

D. Due Process Rights of Prisoners
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973) (a prisoner's
right to due process includes notice, hearing, and an impartial decision maker
before revocation of good time credits and an imposition of punitive segregation).

E. PretrialIdentificationProcedures
Holmes v. United States, 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016
(1972) (pre-indictment photo identification was not so suggestive as to deprive
defendant of due process).
Sturges v. United States ex rel. Kirby, 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant's due
process was not violated by showup; due process clause does not require per se
exclusionary rule be applied to suggestive pretrial identification procedures).

F. Double Jeopardy
Clay v. United States, 481 F.2d 133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973)
(government appeal of dismissal of case for eight-month delay not barred by
double jeopardy clause).
Cullen v. United States, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971) (offense of willfully destroying
public records is not included within the offense of knowing interference with the
administration of selective service laws).
Fleming v. United States, 504 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1974) (defendant could not be
convicted on separate charges for the same offense).
Haygood v. United States, 502 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114
(1974) (jeopardy does not attach in pretrial use of pending charge for sentencing
in a related charge).
Hunter v. United States, 478 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973)
(under the "Wharton Rule" defendants could not be convicted for both the crime
and conspiracy to commit the crime).
Ponto v. United States, 454 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.) rehearingen banc, 454 F.2d 657 (1971)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (dismissal of indictment based on facts not set out in
indictment does not operate as an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy).

G.

Other Decisions on Criminal Law

Booker v. United States, 480 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973) (judge committed error by
refusing to question jurors on possible racial prejudice).
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Brewbaker v. United States, 454 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1972) (defendant not entrapped into making sale of cocaine).
Clay v. United States, 481 F.2d 133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009 (1973)
(eight-month delay between arrest and indictment did not justify dismissal
of the case).
Springer v. United States, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(visits to defendant in custody by agents of prosecutor without notice to appointed counsel violated due process).
United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973) (Waiver of an
objection to evidence on constitutional grounds does not require defendant's full
knowledge and participation with defeise attorney).
Willis v. United States, 515 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1975) (an indictment is not insufficient
for failure to charge felonious intent where intent is implicit in crime charged).
IV.

A.

STATUTORY LAW

Securities Law

(1) Federal Securities Law
Alberto-Culver v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (Seventh Circuit refused to stay Rule 10b-5 action
by American transferee company against German transferor, holding arbitration
provision void under the Securities Exchange Act).
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972)
(Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), retroactively applied; plaintiff shareholders in derivative actions entitled to jury trial).
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (shareholders of a corporation that purchased a business from defendant and who individually guaranteed certain liabilities assumed
by the corporation had standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 ).
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972) (a discretionary trading contract not an "investment contract" subject
to registration because the "element of commonality" under the Howey test
was absent, even though the defendant broker had entered into similar
contracts with other customers).
Mueller v. Korholz, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972)
(lower court's finding that director received no profits within the meaning of
section 16(b) affirmed).
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) (an underwriter
of short term commercial paper has a duty to make reasonable inquiries into the
financial condition of the issuer, including requesting tax returns, corporate minute books and accounting work papers).

(2)

Blue Sky Law

Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975) (fifth amendment due process precluded
the federal government from discriminating, on the basis of a state statute,
against the plaintiff on the presumption that her great aunt, a Chippewa Indian
named Florence Blue Sky Vessel, would have disinherited her because she was
born out of wedlock).
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Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., concurring) (the three-year statute of limitations of Illinois securities law applied,
rather than the five-year limit covering actions for fraud since the former
better effectuated the policy of the federal statutes in protecting the "uninformed,
the ignorant and the gullible").

B. Antitrust Law
Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3202 (Oct. 6,
1975) (facts support FTC's narrow definition of relevant product market).
Corning Glass Works v. FTC, 509 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1975) (manufacturer prohibited
from imposing customer restrictions on wholesalers in free trade states who deal
with retailers in signer-only states).
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972) (employee's conflict of interest in securing reissue of patent with intent to expand coverage of patent claims constitutes predatory practice in finding of attempt to monopolize).
Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974) (relevant product
market for antitrust purposes not narrowed by limited availability of alternate
supplies to terminated petroleum distributor where limitations are due to government regulation during period of shortage).
Panther Pumps & Equip. Co., v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973) (inclusion of no-contest clauses in patent
licensing agreements is not misuse for purposes of barring the holder's infringement claim against non-licensee).
Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973) (summary judgment
enjoining director of competing corporation from holding simultaneous directorship on plaintiff's board affirmed on showing of statutory minimum net worth of
either corporation, horizontal market relationship, and capability of the corporations to combine to violate antitrust law).

C. Federal Taxation
(1)

General

Economy Fin. Corp. v. United States, 501 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1974) (Code § 801(a):
taxpayer corporations failed to qualify as "life insurance companies" for tax
purposes when their life insurance reserves were less than half of their total reserves) (Stevens, J., dissenting: regardless of the wisdom of granting favorable
tax treatment to life insurance companies, the corporation had satisfied the letter
of the statute).
Hart Metal Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 437 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1971) (multiple
issues involving Code §§ 1001 and 1212, 269, 543 and 545(b)(1)).
Kelly v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1971) (Code § 213: hotel expense for
food and lodging incurred while in need of medical treatment and unable to remain in hospital, held properly deductible as medical expense).
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Kenner v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1971) (Code § 7453: best evidence rule
improperly applied; taxpayer's oral proof not automatically excluded merely
because documentary proof is available in pro se defense) (Stevens, J., dissenting: defendant had history of flouting the procedural rules of court and therefore
those rules need not have been relaxed simply because he persisted in appearing
pro se).
Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975) (Code §§ 111, 170, and 1232:
bargain sale to charity constituted a gift; the value determined at the time of
transfer).
Patrick v. United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-6209 (7th Cir. 1975) (taxpayer's
suit to enjoin collection of wagering taxes denied when taxpayer failed to show
that government had no chance of establishing its claim).
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972) (Code §
611: taxpayer's economic interest in gas formations survived lease and rendered
proceeds received ordinary income subject to depletion).
L.C. Thomsen & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 484 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1973) (Code
§ 101: life insurance proceeds received by corporate taxpayer upon the death
of its sole distributor were properly excluded from income although the proceeds approximately equaled in value the uncollectible indebtedness of distributor).

(2)

Tax Fraud

Barrett v. United States, 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975)
(Code §§ 7201 and 7122: grant of immunity from prosecution to accomplice in
tax evasion in exchange for testimony ruled not unlawful) (Stevens, J., dissenting: although evidence of guilt strong, improper and prejudicial conduct at
trial warranted new trial).
Cleveland v. United States, 477 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1973) (Code § 7203: lower court
erred in refusing to allow production of special agent's report under the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), as it related to the subject matter of the agent's
testimony).
Dichiarinte v. United States, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971) (Code § 7201: taxpayer's
conviction reversed because trial court admitted evidence obtained in search
going beyond the scope of taxpayer's consent) (Stevens, J., dissenting: the record
supports the lower court's holding that the defendant fully consented to the
search).
McCarthy v. United States, 445 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1971) (Code § 7201: evidence of
a 38-year-old felony conviction improperly admitted at taxpayer's trial).
Oliver v. United States, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974) (Code § 7201: failure to give
taxpayer warnings of his rights to counsel and to remain silent tainted confession
though taxpayer not in physical custody).
Shaheen v. United States, 445 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1971) (Code § 7402: writ preventing
taxpayer's departure from the United States quashed when government failed
to sustain burden of showing that taxpayer would transfer his assets abroad or
fail to reappear).

D.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (United's no-marriage rule for female flight
cabin attendants not discriminatory on basis of sex).
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E.

Labor Law

Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 963 (7th Cir.), vacated, 411 U.S. 912
(1972) (successor employer's obligation to bargain preceded unilateral change
in working conditions) (Stevens, J., dissenting: employer was free to set initial
terms of employment).
Braswell Motor Freight Lines v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (alleged unfair labor practices were not sufficiently related to other
charges brought to support two Board complaints).
Caravelle Wood Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 504 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1974) (the NLRB did
not abuse its discretion by excluding family of management from bargaining unit
for insufficient "community of interest") (Stevens, J., concurring, noted possible
conflict between the majority decision and the NLRA's neutrality toward those
who oppose unions).
Colonial Manor v. NLRB, 69 CCH Lab. Cas. T 13,007 (7th Cir. 1972) (following strike,
economic striker entitled to reinstatement until he obtained substantially equivalent employment elsewhere).
Duncan Foundry v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1972) (overall reduction of business
because of a strike did not necessarily eliminate jobs of strikers, disqualifying
them from voting in a representation election).
Engineers Local 150 v. Flair Builders, 64 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,479 (7th Cir. 1971)
(Stevens, J., dissenting: the defense of laches is not appropriate in a suit to
compel arbitration).
Hodgson v. Lodge 851, IAM, 454 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1971) (Secretary of Labor
acted in compliance with § 402(b) of LMRDA although he delayed commencement of litigation for more than 60 days).
Louis-Allis Co. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting: misleading information distributed by union required the setting aside of a subsequent election).
Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973) (employees do not have a
statutory right to representation at fact-finding interviews conducted by management during an investigation of suspected theft of company property).
Roselyn Bakeries, Inc. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting: references by employer to lockouts were not an implied threat to discourage
union organization).
Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972) (deferred to NLRB's finding
that plaintiff was discharged from employment for breach of collective bargaining agreement; union did not breach duty of fair representation).
Whitney Stores v. NLRB, 68 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,579 (1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting: board exceeded its discretion in giving controlling importance to the prior
organization in a unit determination).
Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973) (a union officer may not be dismissed
from office for exercising rights guaranteed by LMRDA) (Stevens, J., concurring:
the definition of discipline in § 609 is not broader than in § 101(a)(5)).

F.

Attorney Fees

Allen v. Brady, 508 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1974) (the invalidity of a second patent for
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lack of invention and proof that the holder of the valid patent purchased a license
from assignee of second patent holder did not demonstrate such a lack of candor
that an award of attorney fees was justified).
Associated Gen. Cont. v. Teamster, 486 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1972) (a union can recover
costs and expenses for an erroneous issuance of an injunction up to, but not
in excess of, the injunction bond).
Cousins v. City Council, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1974)
(Stevens, J., concurring: in an action challenging a redistricting ordinance as racially discriminatory, the denial of an application for attorney fees was not an
abuse of discretion).
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Gidding & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.): cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1971) (when plaintiffs infringement action failed because
of its deceptive intention and defendant had performed significant public service
in exposing the potential impact of defective patent reissues, the defendant was
entitled to recover attorney fees).
Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973) (recovery of attorney fees
in an action brought under § 8 of the Clayton Act is unjustified since the Act requires proof of pecuniary injury).
Strassheim v. Gold Medal Folding Furn., 477 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1973) (when a defendant patentee applied for a patent without investigating the possibility of prior
use for greater than one year and misfiled corporate documents that frustrated
discovery, the statutory requirement of an "exceptional care" for the award of
attorney fees was met, and a showing of actual fraud is not necessary).
Tryforos v. Icarian Devel. Co., 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975) (in a diversity action,
the award of attorney fees to a defendant upon dismissal of the suit is determined
by state law).

V.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972) (cancellation of poison registration set aside on ground that Environmental Protection
Agency improperly applied Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act standards under a Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act provision).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975) (motion for
injunction pending appeal denied; FTC may proceed with hearing notwithstanding plaintiff's Freedom of Information Act claim).
United States v. Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 945 (1975) (DDT and dieldrin residues found in smoked chubs held food
additives making fish adulterated and unmarketable under Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act).
Hodgson v. Lodge 851, IAM, 454 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1971) (union held to have voluntarily waived statutory time bar to action by Secretary of Labor through letter
agreeing not to assert any limitation under Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act) (Stevens, J., dissenting: Secretary of Labor either must comply
with time to file provision of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
or forego action against union).
Louis-Allen Co. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1972) (letter written by union suggesting that it had won contested election and thus certain laid-off employees
would be terminated held not a "material misrepresentation of fact" sufficient
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to set aside election) (Stevens, J., dissenting: administrative expertise rationale
should not be used as an excuse for fraudulent labor practices).
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1114 (1973) (Public Service Commission service termination regulations held
not to be action under color of state law, and no full hearing required prior to
termination of customer service thereunder).
United States ex reL Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973) (prisoners denied
due process of law where "good-time" credits revoked and prolonged isolation
ordered in prison disciplinary proceeding without advance written notice to
prisoner or opportunity to be heard or present witnesses).
Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146
(1974) (Federal Trade Commission divestiture order held improper to extent
that it required novel remedial actions without sufficient agency justification).
Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974) (evidence favoring claimant's application for social security benefits held sufficient to reverse denial of benefits
by social security administrator).
Stearns Elec. Paste Co. v. EPA, 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972) (cancellation of poison
registration set aside on ground that Environmental Protection Agency exceeded
its authority under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).

VI.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp., 489 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1973) (the federal antiinjunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), does not apply to state actions commenced after a motion for injunctive relief is filed in federal court).
Carson v. Allied News Co., 511 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1975) (although denying plaintiffs
motion to amend the pleadings in the appellate court by striking nondiverse
parties, Justice Stevens noted in dictum that in appropriate cases, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653 might be read to give the appellate court jurisdiction to strike nondiverse
parties and thereby perfect diversity jurisdiction).
Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972) (court may review interlocutory order in a civil antitrust action).
Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972)
(discharge of government employees for allegedly partisan political reasons presented a first amendment controversy and not a nonjusticiable political question).
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